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Control systems are widely used in modern industry and find wide applications in
power systems, nuclear and chemical plants, the aerospace industry, robotics, communi-
cation devices, and embedded systems. All these systems typically rely on an underlying
computing and networking infrastructure which has considerable security vulnerabilities.
The biggest threat, in this age and time, to modern systems are cyber attacks from ad-
versaries. Recent cyber attacks have practically shut down government websites affecting
government operation, undermined financial institutions, and have even infringed on pub-
lic privacy. Thus it is extremely important to conduct studies on the design and analysis
of secure systems. This work is an effort in this research direction and is mainly focused
on incorporating security in the design of modern control systems.
In the first part of this dissertation, we present a linear quadratic optimal control
problem subjected to security constraints. We consider an adversary which can make
partial noisy measurements of the state. The task of the controller is to generate control
sequences such that the adversary is unable to estimate the terminal state. This is done
by minimizing a quadratic cost while satisfying security constraints. The resulting opti-
mization problems are shown to be convex and the optimal solution is computed using
Lagrangian based techniques. For the case when the terminal state has a discrete distribu-
tion the optimal solution is shown to be nonlinear in the terminal state. This is followed
by considering the case when the terminal state has a continuous distribution. The result-
ing infinite dimensional optimization problems are shown to be convex and the optimal
solution is proven to be affine in the terminal state.
In the next part of this dissertation, we analyze several team decision problems
subjected to security constraints. Specifically, we consider problem formulations where
there are two decision makers each controlling a different dynamical system. Each deci-
sion maker receives information regarding the respective terminal states that it is required
to reach and applies a control sequence accordingly. An adversary makes partial noisy
measurements of the states and tries to estimate the respective terminal states. It is shown
that the optimal solution is affine in the terminal state when it is identical for both systems.
We also consider the general case where the terminal states are correlated. The resulting
infinite dimensional optimization problems are shown to convex programs and we prove
that the optimal solution is affine in the information available to the decision makers.
Next, a stochastic receding horizon control problem is considered and analyzed.
Specifically, we consider a system with bounded disturbances and hard bounds on the
control inputs. Utilizing a suboptimal disturbance feedback scheme, the optimization
problem is shown to be convex. The problem of minimizing the empirical mean of the
cost function is analyzed. We provide bounds on the disturbance sample size to compute
the empirical minimum of the problem. Further, we consider the problem where there are
hard computational constraints and complex on-line optimization is not feasible. This is
addressed by randomly generating both the control inputs and the additive disturbances.
Bounds on sample sizes are provided which guarantee a notion of a probable near min-
imum. Model uncertainty is also incorporated into the framework and relevant bounds
are provided which guarantee a probable near minimax value. This work finds many
applications in miniature devices and miniature robotics.
In the final part of this dissertation, we consider a centralized intrusion detection
problem with jointly optimal sensor placement. A team of sensors make measurements
regarding the presence of an intruder and report their observations to a decision maker.
The decision maker solves a jointly optimal detection and sensor placement problem. For
the case when the number of sensors is equal to the number of placement points, we
prove that uniform placement of sensors is not strictly optimal. We introduce and utilize
a majorization based partial order for the placement of sensors. For the case when the
number of sensors is less than or equal to six, we show that for a fixed local probability of
detection (probability of false alarm) increasing the probability of false alarm (probability
of detection) results in optimal placements that are higher on a majorization based partial
order.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the past two decades, the advent of advanced data sharing technologies has not
only revolutionized modern systems but also how we socially interact with one another.
People from all parts of the globe have connected like never before to form one global
village. In the past, innovation and technology used to be restricted to a few societies
and it took decades for new inventions to reach all parts of the globe. However, this
is no longer the case due to modern data sharing capabilities. Even if a device cannot
practically be available in some parts of the world it’s methodology, functionality, and
usage can widely be known and is readily accessible. The Internet and social media
have enabled users to instantly share information and have completely changed the face
of modern technology. However, the ease with which crucial information regarding any
system can be accessed has also created security vulnerabilities which adversaries can
exploit to undermine and potentially damage a system.
The biggest threats to modern technology in this age and time are cyber attacks from
adversaries. Recent cyber attacks have practically shut down government websites affect-
ing government operation, undermined financial institutions, and have even infringed on
public privacy. These threats effect both on a macro level in terms of affecting big cor-
porations, governments, and public institutions and on a micro level in terms of affecting
1
people through identity thefts and privacy violations.
Past research in the field of system security was mainly focused on designing robust
algorithms and to prevent hacking of computers. While pursuit of such research is worth-
while in its own right an emerging trend is to design security protocols for systems which
have control, networking, and communication capabilities. These problems are multi-
disciplinary and offer the aspiring researcher with many paradigms of exploration. The
recent focus, in academia as well as the industry, towards this field of research is mainly
due to new and emerging threats to industrial systems. It should be noted that control
systems are widely used in modern industry and find wide applications in power systems,
nuclear and chemical plants, the aerospace industry, robotics, communication devices,
and embedded systems. All these systems typically rely on an underlying computing and
networking infrastructure which has considerable security vulnerabilities.
Last year alone, according to the Department of Homeland Security, industrial sys-
tems faced nearly 200 attacks where many of these were of a serious nature (See [1]
and [2] for more details). A majority of these attacks targeted sensitive installations, like
energy and water plants, and the attackers even employed a sophisticated search engine
to find thousands of exposed systems. As mentioned in the Los Angeles Times, cyber
espionage and cyber attacks pose a greater threat to national security than terrorism [3].
According to Forbes [4], “For the first time, the growing risk of computer-launched for-
eign assaults on U.S. infrastructure, including the power grid, transportation hubs and
financial networks, was ranked higher in the U.S. intelligence communitys annual review
of worldwide threats than worries about terrorism”. In light of these discussions, it is
essential to conduct studies on the design and analysis of secure systems. This thesis is
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an effort in this research direction mainly focused on the incorporation of security in the
design of modern control systems.
There are two main types of problems that can be addressed within the framework
of incorporating security in modern control system design. One line of problems involve
securing the system from an adversary which can make measurements regarding system
operation. The other type of problems focus on the issue of detecting the presence of ad-
versaries, within the environment of a system, and then taking actions to eliminate future
threats from such adversaries. The first approach can be considered to be shoring up one’s
defenses against an attack and the second involves detecting and eliminating an adversary
before an attack can take place. Problem formulations and affiliated solution method-
ologies exploring both these areas of research will be considered in detail in subsequent
chapters.
We first consider the type of problems where we design a controller which is secure
enough to withstand potential attacks from an adversary. This is done by incorporat-
ing security constraints in the design of a linear quadratic control problem. It should
be noted that classical control systems were designed without considering such security
constraints, network attacks, and other system failures. Therefore, one cannot rely on
classical control techniques when designing controllers for any application employing
cyber-physical systems.
The term cyber-physical systems is generically used to describe all such physical
systems which rely on a communication network and have computational capabilities.
Research in cyber physical systems is a growing field which offers lots of opportuni-
ties and challenges for both academia as well as the industry. Cyber physical systems
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are expected to play a major role in the design of next generation engineering systems
which will posses a higher level of functionality, security, and reliability than the systems
which are currently in operation today [5]. Research problems within this area are highly
multi-disciplinary and offer many opportunities for research and development in control
systems, network communications, computer security, biomedical engineering, the health
care industry, smart grid research, renewable energy sources, transportation systems, and
many other application areas.
Using the aforementioned system framework we solve linear quadratic control prob-
lems subjected to security constraints and team decision problems subjected to security
constraints. Such a linear quadratic framework which incorporates security constraints is
very general and can be applied to any physical system with linear dynamics, a quadratic
cost, and which wants to secure itself from potential attacks from an adversary. Therefore,
our results have practical significance for any physical system where the controller would
like to hide its terminal operation from an adversary which could leverage information
regarding the terminal state to undermine system operation.
In Team Decision Problems, there are two or more decision makers where each is
tasked with making its own decision utilizing the information made available to it. It
should be noted that the information available to the respective decision makers may or
may not depend on the decisions made by other decision makers. We address team deci-
sion problems from a security perspective by incorporating security constraints and design
optimal controllers subjected to such constraints. Our problem formulation and constraint
structure has not previously been considered in problems of team decision theory and pro-
vides an important extension to this field of research. These decision making problems
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have important practical applications in financial markets, corporate organizations, and
military strategy.
For many control problems of interest, off-line computation is not available and
problem need to be solved on-line. In addition, it is not possible to incorporate hard
constraints in the optimization framework of these problems. Such problems are typically
solved using a Receding Horizon Control (RHC) approach. Another advantage of RHC
is the fact that it is able to anticipate future system behavior and apply appropriate control
inputs accordingly. It should be noted that PID and LQR control techniques do not possess
this ability to predict future system behavior. In RHC, at every time step a suitable control
sequence is generated to solve a finite horizon optimal control problem by utilizing current
and past measurements. The first element of this control sequence is applied to the plant
and the procedure is repeated at the following time step.
Security constraints are generally hard constraints and for implementation purposes
such problems typically require a suitable RHC approach. Therefore, a stochastic reced-
ing horizon control problem is presented and analyzed in subsequent chapters. We con-
sider this problem under assumptions of limited computational capabilities which gen-
erally inhibit the controller’s capability to perform complex on-line optimization. This
inability to use any complex on-line optimization techniques is tackled by adopting an
efficient randomized algorithm based scheme to randomly generate the required control
inputs. The framework considered is general enough to be applied to any control problem
which has hard constraints on the control inputs. This work finds significant applications
in small devices and miniature robotics which is an area of high interest for both the gov-
ernment as well as the industry. The developed techniques provide bounds on sample
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sizes, which guarantee several notions of probable near minimum to an optimal control
problem. It should be noted that efficient and rapid sample generation can be done on any
miniature device by utilizing analog electronics.
We also consider the aforementioned second line of security problems in the design
of control systems. In these problems, the system is tasked to make measurements in
order to detect the presence of an adversary in its environment which could potentially
attack or undermine normal system operation. Due to the recent nature of cyber attacks on
industrial and energy systems it is extremely important to determine potential attackers
before they could launch a cyber attack. The problem formulations that we adopt to
address these problems are quite general and can easily be utilized to design efficient
algorithms and security protocols. Such problems find wide applications in the fields of
optimal sampling, sensor networks, optimal agent placement, cyber espionage, optimal
estimation, intruder detection, biological surveillance, electronic warfare, and military
surveillance.
In the sequel, a security problem is considered where the system is tasked to detect
the presence of an adversary which occurs on a specified set of points with a known
distribution. The system has access to a team of identical sensors which can be deployed
to make measurements regarding the presence of the adversary. The measurements made
by the sensors are assumed to be noisy with well known probabilities of detection and
false alarm which are provided by the manufacturer of these sensors. This problem can
be classified as a centralized detection along with optimal sensor placement. The goal
of this research is to come up with some general sensor placement principles which also
provide jointly optimal intruder detection policies.
6
1.1 Main Contributions
The main research contributions and summaries of the upcoming chapters are pro-
vided below:
1. In Chapter 2, we consider a linear quadratic optimal control problem subject to se-
curity constraints. We consider the presence of an adversary which can make noisy
partial measurements of the state and wants to estimate the terminal state of the
system. The task is to generate control sequences such that the adversary is unable
to estimate the terminal state of the system. This is done by minimizing a quadratic
cost function while satisfying security constraints. Security metrics which provide
different formulations for the security constraints are considered and analyzed. The
optimization problems are shown to be convex and the optimal solution is com-
puted by using Lagrangian based optimization techniques specifically duality. For
the case when the terminal state has a discrete distribution the optimal solution is
shown to be nonlinear in the terminal state.
This is followed by considering the case when the terminal state has a continu-
ous distribution. The security constraints are introduced by using a security metric
based on the difference of conditional means. The resulting infinite dimensional
optimization problems are shown to be convex. The generalized Kuhn Tucker The-
orem is utilized to prove that the optimal solution is affine in the terminal state.
2. In Chapter 3, several team decision problems under security constraints are ana-
lyzed. Specifically, we consider problem formulations where there are two deci-
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sion makers each possessing a different dynamical system. Each decision maker
receives information regarding the respective terminal states that it is required to
reach and applies a control sequence accordingly. An adversary makes partial noisy
measurements of the states of both systems and tries to estimate their respective ter-
minal states. The controllers of both systems minimize a common quadratic cost
criterion. In addition, the terminal states of both systems are assumed to be either
identical or correlated.
We first consider the case where the respective terminal states of both systems are
assumed to be identical. This problem can be solved by utilizing the generalized
Kuhn Tucker theorem along with some regularity conditions. The structure of this
problem is similar to the security problems considered in Chapter 2 and the same
proof techniques are utilized to obtain optimal solutions. We assume that the ter-
minal state is reached by the controller with a continuous distribution. It is shown
that the optimal solution is affine in the terminal state which is identical for both
systems.
Next, we consider the general case where the terminal states of the decision mak-
ers are correlated in the sense that they are both reached with distributions which
have the same mean but different variances. The information available to the deci-
sion makers is the respective terminal states of both systems and the problem has
a partially nested information structure. We use a generalized security metric to
introduce the security constraints. The resulting infinite dimensional optimization
problems are convex. Utilizing the Kuhn Tucker Theorem in conjunction with some
assumptions and regularity conditions we prove that the optimal solution is affine
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in the information available to the respective decision makers.
3. In Chapter 4, a stochastic receding horizon control problem is presented and an-
alyzed. We consider a linear, discrete, and time invariant system with bounded
disturbance noise and hard bounds on the control input. We consider the case when
the distribution of the noise is either unknown or is well known with a distribution
function whose variance is difficult to compute. Utilizing a suboptimal disturbance
feedback scheme, the optimization problem is shown to be convex. The problem
of minimizing the empirical mean of the cost function instead of the expectation
of the cost function is analyzed. Utilizing Pollard dimension theory we provide
bounds on the disturbance sample size to compute the empirical minimum of the
problem. This is done by first computing the Pollard dimension of the family of
cost functions.
Next, we consider the problem formulation where there are hard computational
constraints and the controller is not capable to perform any complex on-line op-
timization. This problem is addressed by randomly generating both the control
inputs and the disturbances from the space of admissible control inputs and the
space of admissible disturbances respectively. Bounds on sample sizes are pro-
vided which guarantee several notions of probable near minimum to the problem.
Finally, model uncertainty is incorporated into the problem framework and relevant
bounds on sample sizes are provided which guarantee the existence of a probable
near minimax value.
4. In Chapter 5, a centralized intruder detection problem with jointly optimal sensor
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placement is considered. Specifically, we consider a team of sensors which is ca-
pable of making noisy measurements regarding the presence of an intruder at a
particular point on which the sensor is placed. It is assumed that the intruder occurs
on a specified set of placement points with a uniform distribution. Sensors make
measurements regarding the presence of the intruder and report their observations
to a centralized decision making authority. The decision maker solves a jointly
optimal detection and sensor placement problem. It is assumed that the number
of placement points is greater or equal to the number of sensors. This is a diffi-
cult optimization problem where the number of ways to place sensors on respective
placement points increases exponentially with the number of sensors. We assume
that the sensors are identical and make conditionally independent observations.
For the case when the number of sensors is equal to the number of placement points,
we prove that uniform placement of sensors is not strictly optimal. This result holds
regardless of the sensor local probability of detection and probability of false alarm.
We introduce a majorization based partial order for the placement of sensors. For
the case when the number of sensors is less than or equal to six, we show that for a
fixed local probability of detection (probability of false alarm) increasing the proba-
bility of false alarm (probability of detection) results in optimal placements that are
placed higher on a majorization based partial order. This result has many practical
applications and can be used in the design of several sub-optimal schemes.
5. We provide conclusions and future research directions in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2: Linear Quadratic Control Under Security Constraints
In this chapter, we consider the problem of designing an optimal control system
subjected to system security constraints. We consider a deterministic, linear, and time-
invariant system for which the terminal state can either take a finite or an infinite number
of values. It is assumed that the controller knows the value of the terminal state to reach
and applies a control sequence accordingly. An adversary makes partial noisy measure-
ments of the state trajectory and wants to estimate the terminal state of the system. It is
assumed that the adversary has knowledge of the set of values taken by the terminal state.
The task of the controller is to develop a strategy to reach the terminal state while
providing minimum information to the adversary thereby hindering its ability to estimate
the terminal state. Different security metrics like the probability of error of the adversary,
in estimating the terminal state, and some conditional mean based security metrics are
considered and analyzed. In the sequel, these security metrics are used to introduce se-
curity constraints. We compute control sequences which minimize a given quadratic cost
function while satisfying these security constraints. The resulting optimization problems
are shown to be convex and techniques from Lagrangian duality and the generalized Kuhn
Tucker theorem are employed to compute the optimal solutions. The cases of a Gaussian
distribution and a more general finite mean distribution for the noise in the measurements
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made by the adversary are considered and analyzed. This problem has important civilian
and military applications. In addition, the problem formulation and the security con-
straints are general enough to be applied to most physical systems where security is a
concern.
Control under cyber-physical security constraints (see [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12], and [13]) is a very active area of research. Many interesting formulations and results
have recently been presented in the literature. In [9], a security problem is considered
where a jammer can block the communication link between the controller and the plant.
The problem is formulated as a dynamic zero sum game and a saddle-point equilibrium
between the controller and the jammer is shown to exist. The optimal jammer policy is
proven to be of a threshold type. The effects of false data injection attacks in control
systems are analyzed in [10]. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under
which the attacker can destabilize the system through false data injections while evading
detection. In [11], system stability and resilience under feedback schemes is characterized
in the presence of attacks on sensors and actuators. A game theoretic analysis is provided
in [12] where an attacker can physically capture sensor nodes in a wireless network,
replicate the captured nodes, and eventually take over the network. Nash equilibrium
solutions are provided for both the cases when the node capture rate is time invariant and
when it is time varying. In [13], the problem of cyber-physical security is addressed by
incorporating a geometric control approach. A mathematical framework for attacks and
monitors is presented and fundamental monitoring limitations are characterized from both
a system theoretic and a graph theoretic perspective.
We motivate the main research framework in this chapter by presenting some inter-
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esting real life applications of such problems:
1. Police Drug Bust: Consider the situation where a convoy of police vehicles is
assigned to inspect suspicious neighborhoods in a city. Once the police convoy
reaches a neighborhood they completely seal all escape routes and do a complete
house to house search for drugs, weapons, and other criminal activity. Also as
soon as a neighborhood is sealed the criminals in other neighborhoods get tipped
off and escape. The police convoy has several routes to reach each neighborhood
respectively. The criminals have spies posted near the police station and can make
some initial measurements regarding the route taken by the convoy. The task of
the convoy is to optimize the route in such a way that the criminals get minimum
information regarding the neighborhood that will actually be inspected by the police
on any given day.
2. Soccer Penalty kick: Consider the situation where a striker in soccer takes a
penalty kick. Now the striker has three options and can either hit the ball straight,
left, or to the right side of the net. The goalkeeper can dive on either side of the net
or stand in the middle in order to stop the penalty. The goalkeeper can make some
measurements by observing how the striker runs in to strike the ball. The task of
the striker is to choose an option and execute the kick such that the goalkeeper can-
not predict the actual location of the ball and score a goal. If the striker adopts the
perfect secrecy policy then the goal keeper will have no choice but to guess where
the striker will strike the ball and make his dive accordingly. In that case the prob-
ability that the goal keeper dives in the right direction is 13 . However, there is also
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a cost affiliated with using a high secrecy policy and the striker might not be able
to strike the ball effectively, based on his limited striking capabilities, if he chooses
a highly secure policy. Therefore, the striker faces a trade off between secrecy and
performance and our mathematical framework in the sections to follow addresses
this trade off.
3. Bat Swarm Predation: Consider a swarm of bats that is flying over to a specific
part of a forest to eat fruits. The swarm is composed of both experienced adult
bats and some juvenile bats. Using its experience an adult bat selects a certain tree
to fly over to and eat some fruits. Now this bat knows that other young bats will
follow it to the selected tree to steal some fruit from it. Therefore, its wants to
hide its terminal tree location as much as possible from other bats until it is time
to make a dive towards the selected tree. The more security it incorporates in its
trajectory until the time to dive the more time it will have to eat fruit before other
bats reach that tree. However, more secrecy which means hiding its strategy till the
last moment before the dive also results in a higher cost as the bat has to put in a lot
of effort to make a really good dive. Therefore, a similar trade off between security
and performance is observed in this natural phenomenon as well.
4. Cruise Missile Control: Consider a cruise missile launching system that is tasked
to strike a set of land based targets from a sea based location. It is assumed that the
intended targets do not have the capabilities to bring down the missiles but given ad-
vance knowledge of the strikes will remove the high value targets from the targeted
locations making the strikes useless. The adversaries have some allies located near
14
the missile launching site which can make some partial noisy measurements of the
trajectories of the missiles. These allies have the ability to then inform the intended
targets of the location of the strikes. The task of the missile launching system is
to design the missile trajectories in such a way that the measurements made by the
adversary cannot determine the intended location of the strikes.
The following notation is adopted:
• Random variables are represented using bold face capital letters, for example XT
is used to represent the terminal state. Realizations of these random variables are
represented using small letters, like xT .
• The probability of error is denoted by Pe, the prior probability distribution by π , the
probability density of a random variable X if it exists by p(x), the joint probability
density of X and Y by p(x,y), and the conditional probability density of X given Y
by p(x|y).
• Capital letter H denotes a hypothesis and M is used to denote the number of hy-
potheses.
• Im×m represents the m×m identity matrix and 0m×n is used to represent the m×n
matrix of zeros. Logarithm to the base 2 and natural logarithm are denoted by log
and ln respectively.
• The standard `p norm is denoted by ‖.‖p.
• The set of real numbers is denoted by ℜ, the n-dimensional space of real numbers
by ℜn, and the empty set is denoted by φ .
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This chapter is organized into five main sections. In Section 1, we present a precise
mathematical formulation of the problem. Section 2 is focused on designing secure con-
trol laws for the case when the terminal state can take two different values with specified
probabilities. Under the assumption of a Gaussian distribution for measurement noise,
we utilize the probability of error as a security constraint. The optimization problem is
shown to be convex. We follow this by considering the case of a more general finite mean
noise distribution. A security constraint based on the conditional mean is analyzed. In
Section 3, we consider the case when the terminal state can take M different values where
M is a natural number. A generalization of the conditional mean based security constraint
is analyzed and the resulting optimization problem is shown to be convex. Section 4 con-
siders the case where the terminal state takes values with a continuous distribution. A
conditional mean based security constraint is analyzed and the optimal solution is shown
to be affine in the terminal state. Simulation based results and related discussions are
provided in detail in Section 5.
2.1 Problem Formulation
Consider the following linear and discrete time-invariant system given by:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk, k = 0, ...,T −1 (2.1)
where xk ∈ℜn is the state of the system, uk ∈ℜm is the control input, A is an n×n
matrix, and B is an n×m matrix. Without loss of generality, the initial state x0 is assumed
to be zero. The cases of both finite and continuous distributions of the terminal state will
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be analyzed. In Section 2, we assume that xT ∈ {x0,x1} and in Section 3 it is assumed that
xT ∈ {x0, ...,xM−1}. The framework for the terminal state with the continuous distribution
case will be presented in Section 4. In the finite distribution case, the desired terminal state
is drawn from {x0, ...,xM−1} with prior distribution π0, ...,πM−1. The controller knows
the value of the terminal state and accordingly applies the appropriate control sequence,
{u0, ...,uT−1}, to reach it.
The adversary does not know the actual value of the terminal state, which is ran-
dom, but knows its distribution. The adversary is restricted to make only the first (k+1)
measurements of the state with k < T . These measurements are noisy and are given as
follows:
Yi =Cxi +Vi, i = 0, ...,k (2.2)
where C is a p× n matrix and V0, ...,Vk are p× 1 independent and identically
distributed random vectors. Using (2.1) we can write the measurement model in compact
form as follows:
Y0,k = C̄U0,k−1 +V0,k (2.3)
















 , C̄ =

0p×m 0p×m . . . 0p×m
CB 0p×m . . . 0p×m
...
... . . .
...




We first consider the case when the noise vectors V0, ...,Vk have a Gaussian distri-
bution and then we consider the case when these noise vectors have a general finite mean
distribution. We assume that πi > 0, where i = 0, ...,M−1.
Main Assumption: The dynamical system is assumed to be controllable in the sense
that starting from the origin any value of the terminal state can be reached at time T , by
applying an appropriate control sequence. Therefore, we are assuming that the matrix:
[
AT−1B AT−2B . . . B
]
is of full rank.
The aforementioned controllability assumption implies that there are many control
sequences which drive the state trajectory to the specified terminal state. We denote any
control sequence which drives the system to the terminal state xi by U i0,T−1. Using the
measurement model, the adversary solves a hypothesis testing problem. Under hypothesis
Hi, when the terminal state is xi, the information available to the adversary is as follows:
Y0,k = C̄U i0,k−1 +V0,k (2.5)
It should be noted that the security constraints are dependent on the information,
C̄U i0,k−1, which is provided by the controller to the adversary. The quadratic cost to be








where Q̃ is a T m×T m symmetric positive definite matrix. The symmetric positive definite






 , Q =

π0Q̃ 0T m×T m . . . 0T m×T m
0T m×T m π1Q̃ . . . 0T m×T m
...
... . . .
...
0T m×T m 0T m×T m . . . πM−1Q̃

(2.7)
Since the control sequences U00,T−1, ...,U
M−1
0,T−1 must drive the system to the terminal states
x0, ...,xM−1 we need to introduce the following equality constraints:
BTU i0,T−1 = x
i, i = 0, ...,M−1 (2.8)
which can be written in compact form as follows:
FU= b (2.9)
where F,b, and BT are given as follows:
F =

BT 0n×T m . . . 0n×T m
0n×T m BT . . . 0n×T m
...
... . . .
...







 , BT =
[
AT−1B, AT−2B, . . . ,B
]
(2.10)
The optimization problem that we will solve will involve minimization of the cost
19
function (2.6), subject to the equality constraint (2.9), and the security constraints that we
will provide in the next two sections. The optimization will be performed with respect
to the control variable U. By utilizing an appropriate re-parametrization the equality
constraints can be removed from this optimization problem . Let Ub be a suitable control
vector which is provided to us and satisfies FUb = b. Note that there always exists such
a control vector because of the controllability assumptions. Let F̃ be the matrix whose
columns form a basis for the Null space of F . Then we can write:
U=Ub + F̃η , η ∈ℜdim(Null(F)) (2.11)
It should be noted from the definition of F̃ that for any η , F(F̃η) = 0. Now η
becomes our new optimization variable and we do not need to incorporate the equality





2.2 Secure Control: A Binary Framework
In this section, we consider the framework where the terminal state can take two
different values x0 and x1 with probabilities π0 and π1 respectively. We consider two
different cases of measurement noise distribution.
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2.2.1 Gaussian Noise Distribution:
Consider the case when V0, ...,Vk are iid and have a Gaussian N (0, Σ̃) distribution.
Then V0,k is a N (0,Σ) random vector where the covariance matrix Σ is block diagonal
and has matrices Σ̃ on its diagonal. The minimum probability of error, in the adversary’s
estimate of the terminal state, is introduced as a security constraint. Under hypotheses H0
and H1 the measurements have the following distributions:
H0 : Y0,k = C̄U00,k−1 +V0,k ∼ N (C̄U
0
0,k−1,Σ) (2.13)
H1 : Y0,k = C̄U10,k−1 +V0,k ∼ N (C̄U10,k−1,Σ) (2.14)
We use a Bayesian formulation with a uniform cost and knowledge of the priors to
compute the minimum probability of error. The optimal Bayes test is a likelihood ratio
















The optimal Bayes test γB is given as follows:
γB(y0,k) =




















Now Y0,k is a Gaussian random vector whose linear transformation by definition
also has a Gaussian distribution. By computing the mean and variance of (U10,k−1 −
U00,k−1)















































where Φ is the pdf of a standard normal N (0,1) distribution. For the special case








Here ρ denotes the Q-function, the tail probability of the standard normal distribu-
tion. Consider the following optimization problem which introduces the probability of
error as a security constraint:
Problem 2.2.1:





subject to the constraint:
Pe ≥ α
where α ≥ 0 is a constraint parameter that we choose. This constraint basically
tells how inaccurate the estimate of the adversary is in determining the actual value of
the terminal state. The value of α provides a measure on the security level of the control
sequences. The following result shows that this security constraint is convex in the opti-
mization variable η .
Proposition 2.2.1.1:
The probability of error constraint is convex in η and Problem 2.2.1 is a convex
program.
Proof:
From (2.19), we note that Pe is decreasing in d which is nonnegative. Therefore:
Pe ≥ α ⇔ d2 ≤ α1
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where α1 can be determined from the values of α , π0, and π1. For the special case where
π0 = π1 we have α1 = 4(ρ−1(α))2. Consider the following notation which enables us to
write d2 in terms of η .
U i0,k−1 = GSi(Ub + F̃η), G = [Ikm×km 0km×(T−k)m]
S0 = [IT m×T m 0T m×T m], S1 = [0T m×T m IT m×T m] (2.21)
d2 = (Ub + F̃η)′(S1−S0)′G′C̄′Σ−1C̄G(S1−S0)(Ub + F̃η)
Clearly d2 is convex in η , d2 ≤ α1 forms a convex set, and the cost is strictly convex in
η . Therefore, Problem 2.2.1 is a convex program.







subject to the constraint:
(Ub + F̃η)′(S1−S0)′G′C̄′Σ−1C̄G(S1−S0)(Ub + F̃η)≤ α1 (2.22)
We can practically solve this convex program by using standard convex optimiza-
tion software like cvx [15]. By making some constraint qualification assumptions we
characterize the optimal solution using Lagrangian duality.
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Assumption 2.1: We assume that α is selected such that:
{
η ∈ℜdim(Null(F)) | (Ub+
F̃η)′(S1−S0)′G′C̄′Σ−1C̄G(S1−S0)(Ub + F̃η)< α1
}
6= φ .
This assumption ensures that there exists a η such that the constraints in (2.22) are
satisfied with strict inequality. This is precisely Slater’s condition (see [16] for details)
for this problem. Therefore, Assumption 2.1 implies that the duality gap is zero.
Proposition 2.2.1.2





F̃ ′QF̃ +λ ∗F̃ ′L ′L F̃
)−1(
F̃ ′Q+λ ∗F̃ ′L ′L
)
Ub
where λ ∗ ≥ 0 is the solution to the following equation:





where L =W ′C̄G(S1−S0), Σ−1 =WW ′, and b is the vector of terminal states.
Proof:
Let Σ−1 = WW ′ be the Cholesky decomposition of the inverse of the covariance
matrix. The Lagrangian can be written as follows:






′LUb +2η ′F̃ ′L ′LUb
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+η ′F̃ ′L ′L F̃η−α1
)
(2.23)
It should be noted that the Lagrangian, L(η ,λ ), is strictly convex in η . This is
due to the columns of F̃ being linearly independent. Strong duality holds from Slater’s
conditions and we can solve the dual problem to get the optimal cost. Strict convexity,
strong duality, and the fact that the optimal cost is finite ensure that we can obtain the
solution of the primal problem through the dual problem [16] (See Ch. 5). The Lagrange
dual function is given by:









′LUb +2η ′F̃ ′L ′LUb
+η ′F̃ ′L ′L F̃η−α1
)}
(2.24)




F̃ ′QF̃ +λ F̃ ′L ′L F̃
)−1(
F̃ ′Q+λ F̃ ′L ′L
)
Ub (2.25)
Plugging (2.25) into (2.24) we get:
g(λ ) =U ′bQUb−2U ′bQF̃
(
F̃ ′QF̃ +λ F̃ ′L ′L F̃
)−1(





F̃ ′Q+λ F̃ ′L ′L
)′(F̃ ′QF̃ +λ F̃ ′L ′L F̃)−1(F̃ ′Q+λ F̃ ′L ′L )Ub +λU ′bL ′LUb
−2λU ′b
(
F̃ ′Q+λ F̃ ′L ′L
)′(F̃ ′QF̃ +λ F̃ ′L ′L F̃)−1F̃ ′L ′LUb−λα
The optimal cost can be obtained by maximizing the Lagrange dual function with
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respect to λ , which is assumed to be non-negative. Differentiating g with respect to λ and




F̃ ′Q+λ F̃ ′L ′L
)′(F̃ ′QF̃ +λ F̃ ′L ′L F̃)−1F̃ ′L ′L F̃(F̃ ′QF̃ +λ F̃ ′L ′L F̃)−1×
(









F̃ ′Q+λ F̃ ′L ′L




Simplifying this equation we get:





Plugging the optimal value of λ ≥ 0, denoted by λ ∗, which solves the above equa-
tion into (2.25) provides an optimal solution to the problem, proving the claim of the
proposition. It should be noted from (2.26) that λ ∗ is non-linear in Ub, which is linear in
b. Therefore, the optimal solution of the problem is non-linear in b.
Proposition 2.2.1.2 gives us a form of the optimal control sequences which will
satisfy the probability of error security constraint. The convexity of this problem makes it
very easy to practically implement these results using commercial optimization solvers.
2.2.2 Finite Mean Noise Distribution
In this section, we consider the case where the noise vectors V0, ...,Vk are iid and
have a general distribution with a finite mean. Computing a closed form expression for the
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probability of error is a very difficult problem with this framework even for the specific
case of the exponential family of distributions [17].
We consider a new security framework based on the conditional mean which leads
to a constraint very similar in structure to (2.22). Let µ be the mean of the noise vector
V0,k, defined in (2.3). Under the hypotheses H0 and H1 the measurement model is given
by:
H0 : Y0,k = C̄GS0(Ub + F̃η)+V0,k
H1 : Y0,k = C̄GS1(Ub + F̃η)+V0,k (2.27)
Problem 2.2.2:





subject to the constraint:
(
E(Y0,k
∣∣H1)−E(Y0,k ∣∣H0))′(E(Y0,k ∣∣H1)−E(Y0,k ∣∣H0))≤ α2 , α2 ≥ 0 (2.28)
The security constraint in (2.28) has a nice operational interpretation. It basically
measures how far apart the means of the observations are under the two hypotheses. The
further apart the means the easier it will be for the adversary to estimate the terminal state.
It has the same intuitive interpretation as the probability of error constraint utilized in the
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previous section. It should be noted that when α2 is equal to zero the adversary does not
get any useful information from the partial noisy state measurements.
Proposition 2.2.2.1:
The security metric in Problem 2.2.2 is convex in η and Problem 2.2.2 is a convex
program.
Proof:
Now the difference between the conditional means can be computed to get:
E(Y0,k
∣∣H1)−E(Y0,k ∣∣H0) = C̄G(S1−S0)(Ub + F̃η) (2.29)
Using (2.29) the constraint in (2.28) can be written as:
U ′bZ
′Z Ub +2η ′F̃ ′Z ′Z Ub +η ′F̃ ′Z ′Z F̃η ≤ α2 (2.30)
where Z = C̄G(S1−S0). Clearly this security constraint is convex and Problem 2.2.2 is
a convex program.
The security constraint (2.30) is very similar to (2.22), as L ′L = Z ′Σ−1Z , and hence
this section generalizes the work in section 2.2.1. In order to be able to use Lagrangian
duality techniques we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.2: We assume that α2 is selected such that:
{
η ∈ℜdim(Null(F)) |U ′bZ ′Z Ub+
2η ′F̃ ′Z ′Z Ub +η ′F̃ ′Z ′Z F̃η < α2
}
6= φ .
This assumption ensures that Slater’s conditions are satisfied for this problem.
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Proposition 2.2.2.2:
The optimal solution of Problem 2.2.2, under Assumption 2.2, is non-linear in b




F̃ ′QF̃ +λ ∗F̃ ′Z ′Z F̃
)−1(
F̃ ′Q+λ ∗F̃ ′Z ′Z
)
Ub
where λ ∗ ≥ 0 is the solution to the following equation:






The proof follows exactly along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 2.2.1.2 to
which the reader is referred.
Using these results we can design a secure controller for any system for which the
adversary makes observations where the additive noise is drawn from a general finite
mean distribution. The aforementioned security constraint can also be extended to the
M-ary framework. We explore and develop one such extension in the following section.
2.3 Secure Control: A M-ary Framework
In this section, we consider the framework where the terminal state can take M
different values x0, ...,xM−1 with probabilities π0, ...,πM−1, respectively. It is assumed
that the measurement noise vector V0,k has a general distribution with a finite mean.
We now present a new security metric which is also defined using the concept of
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the difference of conditional means. Under the hypothesis Hi, i = 0, ...,M− 1, the mea-
surement model is given by:
Hi : Y0,k = C̄GSi(Ub + F̃η)+V0,k, i = 0, ...,M−1 (2.31)




















This security metric can be considered to be a generalization to the concept of the
difference of conditional means which was employed in the binary framework. The dis-
tribution πi is used to assign weights to each quadratic quantity in (2.32), which provides
a difference of the conditional mean given one hypothesis with the weighted sum of the
conditional means given other hypotheses. A smaller value of this metric makes it more
difficult for the adversary to predict the terminal state and indicates a higher level of se-
curity of the control sequences. Using this security metric, we can state the following
optimization problem:



























The parameter α3 is selected to be non-negative. A small α3 indicates that a lower
level of useful information can be transmitted to the adversary. For the case of α3 equal to
zero, the controller will be restricted to those control sequences which generate the same

































′F̃ ′Z ′i ZiUb +η
′F̃ ′Z ′i ZiF̃η
)
≤ α3 (2.35)
Clearly (2.35) is convex in η and hence we conclude that Problem 2.3 is a convex
program. By making similar assumptions we can extend the results stated in section 2.2.2
to the M-ary framework.











′F̃ ′Z ′i ZiUb +η





This assumption ensures that Slater’s conditions are satisfied for this problem and hence
the duality gap is zero.
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Proposition 2.3.1: The optimal solution of Problem 2.3, under Assumption 2.3, is non-














πiF̃ ′Z ′i Zi
)
Ub






















The proof follows exactly like the proof of Proposition 2.2.2.2 to which the reader
is referred.
The results stated in Proposition 2.3.1 are very similar to the results presented in
Propositions 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.2. These results imply that the optimal solution is non-
linear in the vector of terminal states. In order to find the optimal solution in these prob-
lems we need to solve for the equality of a norm to a design parameter. In Proposition
2.3.1, we have the weighted sum of such norms equaling
√
α3.
2.4 Secure Control: Terminal State with a Continuous Distribution
In this section, we consider the situation where the terminal state has a continuous
finite mean distribution with given density function p(xT ). In addition, the components
of the terminal state are assumed to have a finite variance. It is assumed that the adversary
knows the distribution of the terminal state. We first provide a definition of the Gateaux
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differential which will be used repeatedly in this section and also in Chapter 3.
Definition 2.4: (Gateaux Differential [18])
Let X be a vector space and let T be a transformation defined on a domain D ⊂ X . Let
x ∈ D, γ ∈ℜ, and let h be arbitrary in X . If the limit




[T (x+ γh)−T (x)]
exists, it is called the Gateaux differential of T at x with increment h. If the limit exists
for each h ∈ X , then T is said to be Gateaux differentiable at x.
Let U(xT ) be the control sequence which drives the system to the terminal state
xT , which mathematically implies that BTU(xT ) = xT . It should be noted that such a
control sequence exists because of the main controllability assumption. Also in this case









U(xT )′Q̃U(xT )p(xT ) dxT (2.36)
The functions U(.) are L2 integrable and belong to the space L2(ℜn,B(ℜn),µp).
Note that B(ℜn) is the Borel σ -algebra on ℜn and µp is the probability measure cor-
responding to the probability distribution of the terminal state. We use the same tech-
nique which we employed in the previous sections to remove the equality constraint,
BTU(xT ) = xT . Let Ũ(xT ) be a given control function such that BTŨ(xT ) = xT ,∀xT ∈ℜn.
We assume that Ũ(xT ) is linear in xT . This is possible due to the controllability assump-
tion and one possible choice for this control function is Ũ(xT ) = B
†




Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of BT . Let B̃ be a basis for the null space of BT . Then we
can write:
U(xT ) = Ũ(xT )+ B̃η(xT ), η(xT ) ∈ℜq, q = dim(Null(BT )) (2.37)














Ũ(xT )+ B̃η(xT )
)
p(xT ) dxT (2.38)
We assume that the observation noise has a general distribution with a finite mean. Under
the hypothesis HxT , the measurements made by the adversary are given by:
HxT : Y0,k = ḠU(xT )+V0,k, Ḡ = C̄G (2.39)
where C̄ is given by (2.4) and G = [Ikm×km 0km×(T−k)m]. We now introduce the following
















∣∣HxT )−E(Y0,k∣∣HyT ))dyT dxT (2.40)
where yT is another realization of the terminal state. This security metric basically pro-
vides a measure on the difference of the conditional means. The higher the value of this
metric the easier it will be for the adversary to estimate the terminal state. Using the
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Ũ(xT )+ B̃η(xT )
)
p(xT ) dxT


















dyT dxT ≤ α4
where α4 is assumed to be nonnegative. A small value of α4 indicates that a lower
level of useful information is provided to the adversary. If α4 is equal to zero, then the
first k control inputs of all admissible control sequences will be the same. It should be
noted that if α4 is very small and if k is very large then there can be instances when the
problem might be infeasible. However, this can be overcome by assuming much stronger
controllability assumptions. One such assumption could be to require B to be of full
rank to ensure that the problem is feasible for some extreme cases. It should be noted
that Problem 2.4 is an infinite dimensional convex optimization problem. We provide a
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solution to this problem by utilizing the Generalized Kuhn Tucker Theorem [18] (See
Ch. 9).
Assumption 2.4: Consider only those values of α4 for which the appropriate Lagrange











Assumption 2.5: We assume that the constraint parameter, α4, and the system dynamics
are selected such that the optimal solution η∗(.) to Problem 2.4 satisfies the security

































Ũ(xT )+ B̃η∗(xT )
)′
Ḡ′ḠB̃h(yT )p(yT )p(xT )dyT dxT < α4
It should be noted that Assumption 2.5 is the standard regularity assumption re-
quired to apply the Generalized Kuhn Tucker Theorem. This regularity condition is a
natural analog to the interior point condition employed for inequality constraints in the
global theory of convex optimization (see [18]). Note that this condition excludes the
possibility of incorporating an equality constraint by reducing the cone to a point or by
including a constraint and its negative counterpart. Using the concept of Gateaux differ-
entials, Assumption 2.4, Assumption 2.5, and the generalized Kuhn Tucker Theorem we
obtain the following result.
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Proposition 2.4.1: The optimal solution to Problem 2.4, under Assumption 2.4 and As-































































We will first compute the Gateaux differential of the Lagrangian and then use the
generalized Kuhn Tucker theorem conditions to compute the optimal solution. Now the
























Ũ(yT )+ B̃η(yT )
)
dyT dxT (2.42)
For any admissible variation h(.) ∈ L2(ℜn,F ,µp) the Gateaux differential of the La-
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grangian is given by:


























p(xT )p(yT )η(xT )′B̃′Ḡ′Ḡh(yT ) dyT dxT (2.43)















dxT = 0, ∀ h(.)
(2.44)
















p(yT )B̃′Ḡ′ḠB̃η(yT )dyT = 0, ∀xT ∈ℜn (2.45)











Using Assumption 2.4 we get:
∫
ℜn






























which from the Kuhn Tucker conditions is the optimal solution. Also from the Kuhn
































It should be noted that λ ∗ depends upon Ũ(.), p(.), and α4 but not on the terminal state,
xT . Also Ũ(xT ) is selected to be linear in xT . Therefore, we conclude from (2.47) that the
optimal solution to Problem 2.4 is affine in xT .
Proposition 2.4.1 is an interesting result as it shows that the optimal solution is
affine in the terminal state. Contrary to the results in the previous sections we obtain an
affine solution for the case when the terminal state has a continuous distribution. Since
the cost function is strictly convex so the optimal solution is unique. Assumption 2.4 and
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Assumption 2.5 can be checked by first solving the problem and then using the optimal
solution to check if the assumptions are satisfied. It should be noted that Assumption 2.4
allows us to operate only over particular regimes of the parameter, α4. However, it is
not very restrictive and we can still work with a wide range of parameter values as the
assumption fails for only a finite number of values. Such an assumption can be removed
if we consider the following simpler security constraint which also results in a solution
which is affine in the terminal state.
∫
ℜn
p(xT )U(xT )′Ḡ′ḠU(xT ) dxT ≤ α5, α5 ≥ 0 (2.49)
The main difference between these constraints is that in (2.49) we compare the first
k components of a control sequence, which drive the system to a particular terminal state,
with the zero control sequence. For the security constraint employed in Problem 2.4,
we compare the first k components of two control sequences which drive the system to
different terminal state values. Both constraints are then constructed by multiplying with




In this section, we provide an analysis of the behavior of the cost function as the
security constraint parameter is varied. In addition, we utilize simulations to analyze the
behavior of the optimal solution. We consider the framework of Problem 2.2.1 and further




















Let Σ = 2× I12×12, Q = 5× I30×30, and α = 0.45. We assume that T = 5 and k = 2.
Using these values α1 is calculated to be 4
(
ρ−1(0.45)
)2. We use the standard optimiza-
tion software cvx to compute the optimal control sequences. The optimal solution, U, is
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given in (2.50).







































It should be noted that U(1 : 15) correspond to the first 15 elements of the con-





U(16 : 30) correspond to the control inputs which drive the system to the terminal state[
32 37 −8
]′
, respectively. It should be noted that k = 2, m = 3, and hence the ad-
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Cost vs α for the system with terminal state vector b1
versary can only make noisy measurements of the first 2 control inputs, which are colored
red, of these control vectors. Note that the control inputs which the adversary measures in
both cases are very similar to one another thereby providing minimum useful information
to the adversary. This is what we expected and this further signifies the importance of
incorporating security constraints in control problems.
The simulation in Fig. 2.1 utilizes the system described above. We plot the optimal
cost against the constraint parameter α , where Pe ≥ α . As discussed in Section 2.2 if
α > 0.5 then the security constraint becomes infeasible. Clearly as α is increased the
problem becomes more constrained and cost increases respectively. An exponential in-
crease in the cost is observed by an increase in the value of α , for α ≥ 0.14. In Fig. 2.1,[
53 75 100 32 37 −8
]′
was utilized as the vector of terminal states. In order
to avoid any confusion we clarify that the value of the optimal cost, for 0≤ α ≤ 0.15, is
approximately 0.01 and not zero.
We now consider a different dynamical system and a different vector of terminal
44












Figure 2.2: Optimal Cost vs α for the system with terminal state vector b2




















We take Σ = 0.5× I12×12, Q = 10× I30×30, T = 5 and k = 3. Fig. 2.2 shows the
increase in the optimal cost with the value of α for this system. Clearly in this case the
optimal cost increases less rapidly than in the case of Fig. 2.1. Unlike the previous system,
the optimal cost does not stay constant over a large range of values of α . Therefore,
we can conclude that for this system the probability of error constraint is more tightly
enforced as compared to the previous system. Also the rate of change in the optimal
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cost is approximately constant. These simulations further show the importance of the
constraint parameters in the optimal solution. Similar results can be obtained when we
employ constraints based on the conditional mean.
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Chapter 3: Team Decision Theory under Security Constraints
In this chapter, we extend the research ideas presented in Chapter 2 to problems in
Team Decision Theory. We incorporate various security constraints which lead to differ-
ent formulations under the framework of team decision theory. In a team decision prob-
lem, there are two or more decision makers each responsible for making a local decision
by utilizing the information made available to it. The decisions made by the individual
decision makers generally optimize a common cost or payoff criterion. The motivation
for team decision problems initially came from decision making within organizations
( [19], [20], [21]).
The first team decision problem was formulated by Marshak [19], in 1956. The
adopted approach came from game theory and decision theory. The fundamental result
for verifying the global optimality of a team decision rule was first provided by Radner
in [20]. In the literature, this result is commonly referred to as Radner’s Theorem. Un-
der some assumptions it provides sufficient conditions under which a person by person
optimal decision rule is globally optimal and is proved using a Hilbert space approach.
However, this result is difficult to verify due to the requirement of a local finiteness con-
dition. Using this result Radner showed that for the case of a quadratic cost and jointly
Gaussian information variables the optimal solution is affine in the information available
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to the decision makers. The difficulty in verifying the local finiteness condition is over-
come in [22], which provides a generalized version of Radner’s Theorem. This is done by
requiring the existence of certain integrals. This generalized result is then used to estab-
lish the optimality of affine control laws for the exponential of a quadratic performance
index with jointly Gaussian state and observations.
The results presented in ( [19], [20], [21], [22]) deal with the static version of team
decision problems. In static team problems, the information available to any decision
maker is independent of the actions of other decision makers. In contrast, in dynamic
team problems the information available to any decision maker varies with the actions of
other decision makers. In dynamic team problems the dependence of a decision maker’s
rule on the policy of another decision maker converts the problem, with a cost originally
quadratic in the decision rules, into a non convex optimization problem. Similarly this
interdependence converts a Gaussian information structure to be non-Gaussian at the in-
dividual decision maker. The non-convex nature of the cost and the non-Gaussian form of
the information variables make problems in dynamic team decision theory very difficult
to solve.
Under the assumptions of a specialized information structure it is possible to convert
a dynamic team problem into a static team problem. This information structure is called
the “Partially Nested Information Structure” and was first introduced in [23]. In this case
the information of a decision maker, whose decision rule depends on the decisions made
by other decision makers, also contains the information available to those decision makers
and hence can infer their decisions from the available information. It should be noted
that team decision problems with quadratic constraints have been previously considered
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in [24]. However, we consider a different problem formulation and incorporate a new
security constraint framework.
The team decision problems considered in the sequel are subjected to security con-
straints. We consider a team of decision makers each possessing a different dynamical
system and tasked with computing control sequences which generate a specified terminal
state. The initial state of each dynamical system is assumed to be zero. An adversary
makes partial measurements of the state trajectory of each decision maker and tries to
estimate the terminal state. The terminal states are assumed to be either identical or cor-
related. The task of the controllers is to design control sequences such that the respective
state trajectories reach the specified terminal state while minimizing a quadratic cost cri-
terion and satisfying security constraints. The cost function, to be defined in the next
section, is quadratic in the control sequences of the decision makers. Note that the cost is
coupled among the decision makers and is obtained by integrating over the terminal states
with respect to their probability density function.
Utilizing the aforementioned framework our aim is to prove that the optimal control
policies of the decision makers, which provide the globally optimal solution, are affine
in the terminal state. The optimal solution can be obtained from the Generalized Kuhn
Tucker Theorem, which was also utilized in Section 2.4. This requires certain standard
regularity conditions along with assumptions similar in structure to Assumption 2.4.
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3.1 Problem Formulation
In order to simplify the presentation we consider the case when we have two de-
cision makers. This formulation and the corresponding results can easily be extended to
the case when we have more decision makers. Consider the following linear and time
invariant dynamical systems each assigned to a specific decision maker:
(I) :
x1j+1 = A1x1j +B1u1j , j = 0, ...,T −1
Y1j =C1x1j +V1j , j = 0, ...,k
 (3.1)
(II) :
x2j+1 = A2x2j +B2u2j , j = 0, ...,T −1
Y2j =C2x2j +V2j , j = 0, ...,k
 (3.2)
where xij ∈ℜn, i = 1,2, are the states of system (I) and system (II) respectively,
uij ∈ℜm, i = 1,2, are the control inputs, Ai, i = 1,2, are n×n matrices and Bi, i = 1,2, are
the n×m matrices respectively. Y10, ...,Y1k are the measurements corresponding to sys-
tem (I) that are available to the adversary and similarly Y20, ...,Y
2
k are the measurements
of system (II) that are available to the adversary. C1 and C2 are p× n matrices, respec-
tively. V10, ...,V
1
k are p× 1 independent and identically distributed random vectors and
the same assumption holds for V20, ...,V
2
k. We assume that both system (I) and system (II)
are completely controllable. We assume that the noise vectors have a general distribution






























We present two different cases in this chapter. First, we consider the case when
both systems are tasked to drive their state trajectories to an identical terminal state. This
is followed by considering the case when both systems drive their state trajectories to
correlated terminal states.
3.2 Team Decision Theory: Identical Terminal State
In this section, we consider the team problem where the controllers of both systems
are tasked to drive their trajectories to the same terminal state, xT . We assume that the
terminal state, xT , is reached with a continuous distribution. In addition, it is assumed that
this distribution has a finite mean and a finite covariance. We assume that we are given
the probability density function, p(.), of this distribution.
Let U1(xT ) be the sequence of control inputs that drive the state trajectory of system
(I) to the terminal state xT and similarly let U2(xT ) be the sequence of control inputs which













The measurements made by the adversary are assumed to have a general noise
distribution with a finite mean. Under the hypothesis HxT , for which the terminal state is








0,k = Ḡ2U2(xT )+V
2
0,k (3.5)
where Ḡ1 and Ḡ2 are given by:





 , C̄i =

0p×m 0p×m · · · 0p×m
CiBi 0p×m · · · 0p×m
...




i Bi · · · CiBi

, i = 1,2 (3.6)
Since the control sequence Ui(xT ), i = 1,2, drives the state trajectories of the re-
spective dynamical systems to the terminal state, xT , the following equality constraints
are required:





i Bi · · · Bi
]
, i = 1,2 (3.7)
Now utilizing the structure of the security metric presented in Section 2.4, we intro-



















































where yT is another realization for the terminal state. This security metric mea-
sures the difference of the conditional means for the two systems for different terminal
state values and then adds their sum. Using equation (3.5) we get that the difference of









= ḠiUi(xT )− ḠiUi(yT ), i = 1,2 (3.9)




























From the above expression we note that this security metric provides a measure
on the difference of the state trajectories whose noisy counterpart is accessible to the
adversary. A lower value of this metric indicates a more secure policy for both systems.
In this metric the integral of the differences of state trajectories for different terminal states
of both systems are weighted equally. We can also assign other weights without changing
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the problem structure significantly and the solution methodology outlined below will also






U1(xT )′Q1U1(xT )+U2(xT )′Q2U2(xT ) dxT



























dyT dxT ≤ γ1
F1U1(xT ) = xT , F2U2(xT ) = xT
where Q1 and Q1 are symmetric positive definite matrices of appropriate dimen-
sions. It should be noted that the security parameter γ1 is taken to be nonnegative. The
security constraint provides a level of security offered by the respective controllers. The
functions U1(.) and U2 are L2 integrable and belong to the space L2(ℜn,B(ℜn),µp).
Note that B(ℜn) is the Borel σ -algebra on ℜn and µp is the probability measure corre-
sponding to the distribution of the terminal state.
It should be noted that in Problem 3.1 both the cost and security constraints of both
systems are coupled. Therefore, the optimal solution of a decision maker will depend on
the optimal policy employed by the other decision maker. Also the same information,
which is the terminal state, is available to both decision makers and hence the problem
has a partially nested information structure.
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Now using the same technique that was utilized in Chapter 2 we can remove the
equality constraints in (3.7) and also write the aforementioned problem in a more compact




 , F =
F1 0
0 F2
 , Ḡ =
Ḡ1 0
0 Ḡ2








 , xT ∈ℜn (3.11)




 , FF̃η(xT ) = 0, xT ∈ℜn
where η(.) is a q× 1 dimensional function which will serve as our new optimization
parameter. Note that q is the dimension of the Null space of F . Also Ũ(.) is selected to
be linear in the terminal state. This is possible due to the controllability assumption of
the dynamical systems. Using this notation the control input function can be expressed as
follows:
U(xT ) = Ũ(xT )+ F̃η(xT )
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Ũ(xT )−Ũ(yT )+ F̃η(xT )− F̃η(yT )
)










Ũ(xT )+ F̃η(xT )
)
dxt

















p(xT )p(yT )dxT dyT ≤ γ1
We will solve Problem 3.1 by utilizing the Generalized Kuhn Tucker Theorem. In order
to do that we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 3.1: It is assumed that we consider only those values of γ1 for which the












Assumption 3.2: We assume that the constraint parameter, γ1, and the system dynamics
are selected such that the optimal solution η∗(.) to Problem 3.1 satisfies the aforemen-
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Ũ(xT )+ F̃η∗(xT )
)′
Ḡ′ḠF̃h(yT )p(yT )p(xT )dyT dxT < γ1
It should be noted that Assumption 3.2 is the standard regularity assumption required to
apply the Generalized Kuhn Tucker Theorem. Note that this assumption excludes the
possibility of incorporating an equality constraint. Using the concept of Gateaux differ-
entials, Assumption 3.1, Assumption 3.2, and the generalized Kuhn Tucker Theorem we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.1: The optimal solution of Problem 3.1 under Assumption 3.1 and As-




F̃ ′QF̃ +2λ ∗F̃ ′Ḡ′ḠF̃
)−1(

























































Proof. The proof of Proposition 3.1 follows along the same lines as the proof of Proposi-
tion 2.4.1 to which the reader is reffered.
Since the cost function is strictly convex so it should be noted that the optimal
solution is unique. Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.2 can be checked by first solving
the problem and then using the optimal solution to check if the assumptions are satisfied.
It should be noted that Assumption 3.1 allows us to operate only over particular regimes
of the parameter, γ1. However, it is not very restrictive and we can still work with a wide
range of parameter values as the assumption fails for only a finite number of values.
3.3 Team Decision Theory: Correlated Terminal State
The problem formulation presented in Section 3.1 is for the case when the terminal
state is identical for both decision makers. A more general problem formulation is when
the terminal states are not identical but correlated in the sense that they both have the
same mean but different variance. Consider the same system dynamics for both decision
makers which was provided in Section 3.1. We assume that both systems are completely
controllable. Consider the following terminal states corresponding to system (I) and sys-
tem (II):
x1T = w1 +w3, x
2
T = w2 +w3 (3.12)
where w1, w2, and w3 are independent Gaussian random vectors. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that the mean vector of both w1 and w2 is zero and w3 is not zero. Therefore,
the terminal states have the same mean but different variance. The information variable
which contains information regarding both terminal states is available to both decision
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This assumption ensures that this team decision problem has a partially nested informa-
tion structure. It should be noted that the information variable z has a Gaussian distribu-
tion with density function q(.). Using a similar notation to the problem formulation in
Section 3.2, let U1(z) be the control sequence that drives system (I) to the terminal state














We require the following equality constraints:
F1U1(z) = x1T , F2U2(z) = x
2
T (3.14)





i Bi · · · Bi
]
, i = 1,2
We assume that the adversary makes partial noisy measurements of both systems and
wants to estimate their respective terminal states. Under Hypothesis Hz the following
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measurement model is available to the adversary:







where Ḡ1 and Ḡ2 are given by:





 , C̄i =

0p×m 0p×m · · · 0p×m
CiBi 0p×m · · · 0p×m
...




i Bi · · · CiBi

, i = 1,2
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the noise vectors V10,k and V
2
0,k are assumed to have a
general distribution with a finite mean. Now we introduce a more general security metric






























where z1 and z2 are realizations of the information variable which is available to the
decision makers. It should be noted that this security metric measures the difference
of the conditional means of each system with respect to different hypotheses and also
provides a measure on the difference of conditional means of both systems with respect
to one another. The last term of this security metric enables us to secure the system
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from an adversary which would like to take advantage due to the correlated nature of the
terminal states of both systems. Now using the measurement model this security metric


































We are familiar with the first two terms of the security metric as they were introduced
in the previous section. The last term measures the difference, for a given information
variable, between the first (k+1) values of the state trajectories of system (I) and system
(II) respectively. A small value of this last term ensures that the adversary cannot exploit
information regarding the terminal states, due to their correlation, by separately observing












subject to the constraints:









































where γ ≥ 0 is the constraint parameter. The functions U1(.) and U2 are L2 in-
tegrable and belong to the space L2(ℜ2n,B(ℜ2n),µq). Note that B(ℜ2n) is the Borel
σ -algebra on ℜ2n and µq is the probability measure corresponding to the distribution of
the information variable, z.
It should be noted that Problem 3.3 is an infinite dimensional convex optimization
problem. Also note that each decision maker has access to the information variable,
z. Therefore, this problem has a partially nested information structure. Our framework
and constraints are unique and offer an important extension to the field of team decision








Using this notation the equality constraints can be re-written as: FU(z) = z, z ∈ℜ2n




 , Ḡ =
Ḡ1 0
0 Ḡ2





































































Now we will use the same technique that has been utilized previously to remove the
equality constraints. Let Ũ(z) be a given control function such that:
FŨ(z) = z, z ∈ℜ2n
Let F̃ be a basis for the Null space of F such that:
FF̃η(z) = 0, η(z) ∈ℜq, q = dim(Null(F))
Using this we can re-write the control function U(z) as follows:
U(z) = Ũ(z)+ F̃η(z)
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We will solve Problem 3.2 by utilizing the generalized Kuhn Tucker Theorem. In order
to do that we need to make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3.3: We consider only those values of γ2 for which the appropriate Lagrange












Assumption 3.4: We assume that the constraint parameter, γ2, and the system dynamics
are selected such that the optimal solution η∗(.) to Problem 3.2 satisfies the aforemen-











































∗(z1)′F̃ ′Ḡ′ḠF̃h(z2)q(z1)q(z2)dz1dz2 < γ2
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It should be noted that Assumption 3.4 is a standard regularity condition that is required
in order to apply the generalized Kuhn Tucker Theorem. Using Assumption 3.3 and As-
sumption 3.4 we can state the following result:
Proposition 3.2: The optimal solution to Problem 3.2 under Assumption 3.3 and Assump-









































and the appropriate Lagrange





























Proof. Now using the cost function, the security constraint, and a Lagrange multiplier, λ ,

















































































followed by integrating the resulting expres-

















is invertible due to Assumption 3.3. Now plugging (3.21)

















































Since Ũ(z) is selected to be linear in z so the optimal solution is affine in z. Also from the































This completes the proof.
It should be noted that the Lagrange multiplier is a function of Ũ(.), the probability
density q(.), and the system dynamics but does not depend on the information variable
z. The controller of each system uses the terminal state information of the other system
to derive its inputs. This is due to the structure of our security metric which aims to
minimize the benefit that an adversary can gain by utilizing the correlative nature of the
terminal states. Therefore, we can claim that not only are the individual control systems
secure from an adversary but the overall team decision system is secure from an adversary
which aims to make measurements regarding system operation to potentially undermine
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system operation.
Since the cost function is strictly convex so it should be noted that the optimal
solution is unique. Assumption 3.3 and Assumption 3.4 can be checked by first solving
the problem and then using the optimal solution to check if the assumptions are satisfied.
It should be noted that these assumptions are not really restrictive and are valid for a large
set of problems. Our results are along the same lines as that of Radner [20] which state
that the optimal solution of the team decision problem under some assumptions is affine in
the information variables. The important difference is that we have incorporated security
constraints in this problem formulation and have utilized the Kuhn Tucker Theorem to
prove our results.
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Chapter 4: Stochastic Receding Horizon Control using Randomized Al-
gorithms
Receding horizon control (RHC) or Model predictive control (MPC) is a pervasive
control technique, typically employed to solve constrained problems where off-line com-
putation is impractical and the problem needs to be solved on-line. In the deterministic
setting, a suitable finite horizon control sequence is generated at each time step by using
current and past measurements. The first element of this control sequence is applied to
the plant and the procedure is repeated at the following time step. Most formulations of
robust RHC minimize a cost evaluated at the maximizing disturbance. It is well known
that such min-max formulations may lead to conservative designs. Using appropriate
noise assumptions, recent results focus on either extending the deterministic framework
or optimization in the feedback policy space.
In stochastic receding horizon control (SRHC) the disturbances are modeled as
stochastic processes, whose statistical descriptions are known, and the expectation of the
cost function is minimized. Such an alternative framework leads to results that may be
less conservative than min-max formulations. In order to account for the presence of dis-
turbances the optimization is performed with respect to control policies rather than control
sequences. This is an active area of research and some exciting related work has appeared
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in ( [27], [28], [29], and [30]). A SRHC problem with multiplicative noise is given in [27],
where hard state and control constraints are converted to soft probabilistic ones and the
resulting optimization problem is formulated as a semi-definite program. In [28], a SRHC
problem formulation is provided by employing a stochastic programming approach and
efficient solution techniques are presented. In [29], the case of unbounded noise is consid-
ered along with hard bounds on the control inputs. A sub-optimal feedback scheme utiliz-
ing the available noise measurements is used to convert the optimization problem into a
convex program. Constraints and noise assumptions similar to [29] are used in [30], along
with selecting the controller on some suitable function spaces. The resulting optimization
problems in [30], are shown to be convex.
An interesting research area where SRHC can have important applications is small
scale devices like miniature robotics, small sensors, and other small platforms which re-
quire on-line computation. Such devices have low power and limited payload capabilities
and cannot accommodate the infrastructure required to perform complex on-line compu-
tation. The main contribution of this chapter is to provide a finite horizon optimal control
problem, inspired by SRHC, and to present bounds on disturbance and control sample
sizes using results from randomized algorithms. Such randomization based techniques
require limited computations and can be implemented on many small devices. It should
be noted that randomized algorithms (see [31]) have previously been implemented in ro-
bust control (see [32], [33]) and utilized in [34] and [35] in the context of RHC. In [34],
a random convex programming technique is used to solve a min-max formulation of the
robust RHC problem while [35] uses a dynamic programming (DP) technique to mini-
mize the empirical mean of the cost function in a SRHC setting. Such DP based schemes
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are computationally complex, suffer from the curse of dimensionality, and are generally
inapplicable towards small devices.
We consider a finite horizon optimal control problem with hard bounds on the con-
trol inputs and bounded noise. The bounded noise assumption enables us to incorporate
statistical learning techniques. In addition to considering the case when the system is
affected by additive disturbances we also present an analysis for the case when the sys-
tem is affected by both additive disturbances and model uncertainty. The computational
complexity is reduced by seeking sub-optimal solutions. This is done by using a spe-
cialized disturbance feedback scheme when only additive disturbances are present and
a specialized state feedback scheme when both additive disturbances and model uncer-
tainty are present. These sub-optimal feedback schemes allow us to significantly reduce
the computational complexity of these problems.
The following notation is adopted:
• Let ℜ denote the set of real numbers and let Z+ denote the set of nonnegative
integers.
• The probability measure associated with a random variable X is denoted by PX . If
X1, ...,Xk are independent and identically distributed (iid) samples of X then the
product probability measure PX1 × ....×PXk is denoted by P
k
X . If Ω is the sample
space of X then the product sample space for the iid samples is denoted by Ωk.
• Im×m represents the m×m identity matrix and 0m×n represents the m×n matrix of
zeros. For a n×1 vector x, xi denotes the ith element where i = 1, ...,n.
• Exi[.] denotes the conditional expectation of [.] given xi.
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• Logarithm to the base 2 and natural logarithm are denoted by log and ln respec-
tively.
• d.e denotes the ceiling function and ‖.‖p denotes the standard `p norm.
This chapter is organized in five main sections. In Section 1, we provide the prob-
lem formulation for the case where noise enters the system in the form of additive distur-
bances. Randomized algorithms for minimizing the empirical mean of the cost function
using Pollard dimension theory are provided in Section 2. In Section 3, both the additive
disturbances and the control parameters are randomly generated, according to specific
probability measures. Bounds on control and disturbance sample sizes, which guarantee
certain performance specifications, are provided. The case incorporating model uncer-
tainty along with additive disturbances is considered in Section 4. Finally, simulations
and a performance based analysis is presented in Section 5.
4.1 Problem Formulation
Consider the following linear time-invariant system in discrete time:
xi+1 = Axi +Bui +Dwi , i ∈ Z+ (4.1)
where xi ∈ ℜn is the state, ui ∈ ℜm is the control input, and wi ∈ ℜn is the additive
disturbance. A is an n×n matrix, B is an n×m matrix, and we assume that D is an n×n
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non-singular matrix. The disturbances form an iid process and are bounded as follows:
wi ∈W = {w ∈ℜn | ‖w‖∞ ≤Wmax}, i ∈ Z+ (4.2)
We assume hard bounds on the control inputs which are given by:
ui ∈U = {u ∈ℜm | ‖u‖∞ ≤Umax}, i ∈ Z+ (4.3)
The input bound Umax and the disturbance bound Wmax are assumed to be known. The













subject to the aforementioned dynamics and constraints. We assume knowledge of the
initial state xk. Qk, ...,Qk+N and Rk, ...,Rk+N are n× n and m×m matrices which are
assumed symmetric and positive definite. Given the initial state xk, we want to minimize












πk+N−1(xk,xk+1, . . . ,xk+N−1)

(4.5)
where πk, ...,πk+N−1 are control policies that satisfy (4.3). It should be noted that
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only the initial state xk is known to us. The states xk+1, ...,xk+N−1 are random and de-
pendent upon the additive disturbances wk, ...,wk+N−2 and the stochastic control inputs.
Control policies are designed to account for the presence of disturbances in the system. If
control sequences were used instead of control policies, as is done in the case of the clas-
sical RHC problem, then the effect of disturbances would be unaccounted for and would
lead to stability issues and poor performance. The SRHC approach can be described as
follows:
1. Given the initial state xk, determine an optimal control policy sequence {π∗k , ....,π∗k+N−1}
that minimizes the cost function subject to the constraints.
2. Apply the first element of the control vector (resulting from the optimal policy), u∗k ,
to the dynamical system.
3. update k to k+1 and repeat step 1.
It should be noted that the system dynamics and the cost are time invariant. Therefore, it
suffices to only consider the case k = 0. Consider the following problem:













over causal state feedback policies, subject to the system dynamics (4.1), (4.2), and con-
trol constraints (4.3).
In order to obtain an optimal solution to the aforementioned problem we need to
solve the associated dynamic programming equations. Instead, in this work we focus on
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the following sub-optimal disturbance feedback scheme, previously employed by ( [29],





Mi, jw j + vi, i ∈ {0, ...,N−1} (4.7)
where Mi, j is an m×n matrix and vi is an n×1 vector. Given x0, ...,xN the disturbances
w0, ...,wN−1 can be calculated from the equation:
wi = D−1{xi+1−Axi−Bui}, i ∈ {0, ...,N−1} (4.8)
The disturbance feedback scheme (4.7) can be shown to be equivalent (see [36]) to the





Ki, jx j + ṽi, i ∈ {0, ...,N−1} (4.9)
The feedback gain matrices K̄, M̄ and the vectors V , Ṽ are given by:
M̄ =

0m×n 0m×n 0m×n . . . 0m×n
M1,0 0m×n 0m×n . . . 0m×n
M2,0 M2,1 0m×n . . . 0m×n
...
...
... . . .
...



















K0,0 0m×n 0m×n . . . 0m×n
K1,0 K1,1 0m×n . . . 0m×n
...
...
... . . .
...

























′Q̄X +U ′R̄U (4.10)
where Ā, B̄, D̄, Q̄, R̄, and X are given as follows:
U = M̄W +V, X = Āx0 + B̄U + D̄W (4.11)
Q̄=

Q0 0n×n . . . 0n×n
0n×n Q1 . . . 0n×n
...
... . . .
...




R0 0m×m . . . 0m×m
0m×m R1 . . . 0m×m
...
... . . .
...

















0n×m 0n×m 0n×m . . . 0n×m
B 0n×m 0n×m . . . 0n×m
AB B 0n×m . . . 0n×m
...
...
... . . .
...




0n×n 0n×n 0n×n . . . 0n×n
D 0n×n 0n×n . . . 0n×n
AD D 0n×n . . . 0n×n
...
...
... . . .
...
AN−1D AN−2D . . . . . . D

The equivalence of (4.7) and (4.9) is in the sense that for any admissible (K̄,Ṽ ) an ad-
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missible (M̄,V ) can be found that yields the same state and input for all disturbances.
Utilizing the disturbance feedback scheme we show that the minimization of the expecta-
tion of (4.10), subject to (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) is convex.
Proposition 4.1: Consider the dynamical system (4.1) affected by the additive distur-
bances (4.2) and subject to the control constraints (4.3). Then Problem 4.1 under the
disturbance feedback scheme (4.7) is a convex program with respect to the decision vari-








′Q̄D̄W +2W ′D̄′Q̄B̄(M̄W +V )+
W ′D̄′Q̄D̄W +(M̄W +V )′(B̄′Q̄B̄+ R̄)(M̄W +V )
]
subject to:
‖M̄W +V‖∞ ≤Umax, W ∈W N (4.12)
Proof. Now X and U are affine functions of the decision variables (M̄,V ), the cost X ′Q̄X+
U ′R̄U is quadratic, and Q̄ and R̄ are positive definite. Therefore X ′Q̄X +U ′R̄U is convex
in the decision variables (M̄,V ). Now taking expectation retains convexity (see [16], sec-
tion 3.2) so we can conclude that the cost function is convex. Also M̄W +V is convex in
the decision variables and the infinity norm is component wise nondecreasing hence the
constraints form a convex set (see [16] pp. 87-88) in the decision variables. Therefore,
we conclude that the optimization problem is a convex program.
77
Now plugging (4.11) into (4.10) we get:
X ′Q̄X +U ′R̄U = x′0Ā
′Q̄Āx0 +2x′0Ā
′Q̄B̄(M̄W +V )+2x′0Ā
′Q̄D̄W +2W ′D̄′Q̄B̄(M̄W +V )
+(M̄W +V )′B̄′Q̄B̄(M̄W +V )+W ′D̄′Q̄D̄W +W ′M̄′R̄M̄W +2V ′R̄M̄W +V ′R̄V






′Q̄B̄(M̄W +V )+2W ′D̄′Q̄B̄(M̄W +V )+2x′0Ā
′Q̄D̄W +W ′D̄′Q̄D̄W
+ (M̄W +V )′(B̄′Q̄B̄+ R̄)(M̄W +V )
]
This completes the proof.





where M̄i corresponds to the ith row of the matrix M̄ and Vi is the ith element of the vector
V .
4.2 Randomized Algorithms: Utilizing the Pollard Dimension
It is assumed that either the distribution of the disturbance is unknown or is known
with a probability density function whose variance is difficult to compute. Therefore,
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instead of minimizing the expectation of the cost function in Problem 4.1, we will refor-
mulate the problem by minimizing the empirical mean of the cost function. It should be
noted that we need the iid samples of the disturbances to compute the empirical mean of
the cost function. We utilize some results from statistical learning theory to compute the
required disturbance sample size. To simplify our notation we define:
C(M̄,V,W ) = x′0Ā
′Q̄Āx0 +2x′0Ā
′Q̄B̄(M̄W +V )+2x′0Ā
′Q̄D̄W +2W ′D̄′Q̄B̄(M̄W +V )
+W ′D̄′Q̄D̄W +(M̄W +V )′(B̄′Q̄B̄+ R̄)(M̄W +V ) (4.13)
Using Hölder’s inequality we get:
C(M̄,V,W )≤ ‖x0‖∞‖Ā′Q̄Āx0‖1 +2‖B̄′Q̄Āx0‖1Umax +2‖D̄′Q̄Āx0‖1Wmax+
2‖B̄′Q̄D̄W‖1Umax +‖(B̄′Q̄B̄+ R̄)(M̄W +V )‖1Umax +‖D̄′Q̄D̄W‖1Wmax ≤Cmax (4.14)




{|Vi|+‖M̄i‖1Wmax} ≤Umax , ‖W‖∞ ≤Wmax





So the normalized cost takes values in the bounded interval [0,1]. Next, we generate iid
samples (W 1, ...,W γ) of the disturbance vector W according to the probability measure
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PW and define the empirical mean of the normalized cost as follows:









Problem 4.2: Consider the following optimization problem:
min
M̄,V
Ĉ(M̄,V,W 1, ...,W γ)




Problem 4.2 is a relaxation of Problem 4.1 that retains convexity and is computa-
tionally more tractable because it does not require any integration. The sample size in
(4.16) must be selected so that the solution of Problem 4.2 is guaranteed to perform well
when compared to the solution in Problem 4.1. A useful sample selection policy is given
by the Chernoff bound combined with Hoeffding’s inequality [43]:
PγW
{
(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ :
∣∣∣∣Ĉ(M̄,V,W 1, ...,W γ)−Ex0{C(M̄,V,W )}∣∣∣∣≥ ε}≤ 2e−2γε2
(4.17)
We can use the Chernoff bound to find the appropriate disturbance sample size.
However, this has a limitation in the sense that (4.17) is for a given (M̄,V ) and does not
provide a criterion for comparing the optimal solutions of both problems. Using bounds
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from statistical learning theory (see [33], [44]) and Pollard dimension theory (see [43],
[45]) we can compare the performance of empirical minima of the cost function, provided
by the solution of Problem 4.2, to the optimal minima that is provided by the solution of
Problem 4.1. The upcoming results and the affiliated discussions in the sequel will further
clarify this comparison criterion.
Definition 4.2: (Pollard Dimension [43]) Consider a measurable space (Ω,F ) and a
family of real valued, bounded, non-negative, measurable functions G on this space with
an upper bound κ . A set S = {x1, ...,xn} ⊆ Ω is said to be P-shattered by G if there
exists a real vector c ∈ [0,κ]n such that for every binary vector e ∈ {0,1}n, there exists a
corresponding function ge ∈ G such that:

ge(xi)≥ ci i f ei = 1
ge(xi)< ci i f ei = 0

The Pollard dimension, denoted P-dimension, is the largest integer n such that there
exists a set of cardinality n that is P-shattered by G .
Define the decision variable y = (M̄,V ) and the admissible control space Y as
follows:
Y = {y ∈ℜNm×Nn×ℜNm : max
i=1,...,Nm
|Vi|+‖M̄i‖1Wmax ≤Umax}
Denote C(y, .) as Cy where Cy : W → [0,1]. We will compute the P-dimension of
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the function family Ψ. The family of functions Ψ is defined by:
Ψ = {Cy : y ∈ Y }
Lemma 4.2: The P-dimension of Ψ is upper bounded by 2(Nn+1)(Nm) log(8e).
Proof. We will use a result from [46] to compute the P-dimension, which is also stated
according to our settings in [43]. However, in order to use this result we have to refor-
mulate the admissible control space Y as a vector space. In its current form, Y is a
product of a matrix space with a vector space. This is done by vectorizing the matrix M̄
and forming a new vector Z which contains M̄ and V . It should be noted that this change
of variables does not change the structure of the optimization problem.
Let M̄(:,1),M̄(:,2), ...,M̄(:,Nn) denote the columns of the matrix M̄. Next, we define









Define the matrices H j, j = 1, ...,Nn+1 as follows:
H1 = [INm×Nm, 0Nm×NnNm] , HNn+1 = [0Nm×NnNm, INm×Nm]
Hi = [0Nm×(i−1)Nm, INm×Nm, 0Nm×(Nn−i+1)Nm], i = 2, ...,Nn (4.19)
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By plugging (4.20) into (4.13) we can write C(y,W ) < c as the following polynomial
































The degree of this polynomial inequality with respect to the vector Z is 2. There-
fore, by utilizing Theorem 11.1 of [43] we conclude that the P-dimension of Ψ is upper
bounded by, Ψ≤ 2(Nn+1)(Nm) log(8e).
Next, we state Pollard’s Theorem, see [33] for more details, which will be used to
prove a result in this chapter:
Theorem 4.2.1: (Pollard) Let J be a family of measurable functions mapping a set
B⊆ℜNm into [0,1]. Assume that the Pollard dimension of this function family is d < ∞.




(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W Nγ : sup
J∈J













Note that Pollard’s Theorem is a result on the Uniform Convergence of Empirical
Means (UCEM). It is now applied in conjunction with Lemma 4.2, to outline a perfor-
mance criterion for the efficiency of the solution of Problem 4.2. This is done by providing
an appropriate lower bound on the disturbance sample size.
Theorem 4.2.2: Let W 1, ...,W γ be iid samples of the disturbance vector W generated
according to the probability measure PW and let ŷ∗ = argmin
y∈Y
Ĉ(y,W 1, ...,W γ). Given

























Proof. By applying Pollard’s theorem and Lemma 3.1 we get that:
PγW
{
(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W Nγ : sup
Cy∈Ψ















Let y∗ = argmin
y∈Y
EC(y,W ). Then by using (4.22) we can write:
PγW
{
(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W Nγ :










































































+EC(ŷ∗,W ) ≥ − ε +EC(ŷ∗,W ) (4.24)
Now using (4.23), (4.24), and the value of γ we get:
PγW
{














This completes the proof of the theorem.
It should be noted that the results outlined in Theorem 4.2.2 require us to solve
a convex program. This might not be practically possible for some important resource-
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constrained applications. The results developed in the next section address such situations
where we have severe computational constraints.
4.3 Randomized Algorithms: Randomly Generated Control Inputs
In many control problems, that involve constrained large scale dynamical systems,
the minimization of the empirical cost could be computationally intensive. We mitigate
this problem by randomly generating both the control parameters and the additive distur-
bances and solve for a probable near minimum to Problem 4.1. First, we define several
notions of probable near minimum to a cost function.
Definition 4.3.1: (Probably Approximate Near Minimum to Level α [43]) Let (X ,F ,PX)
be a probability space, f : X→ℜ be a measurable function, and α > 0 be some given real
number. A number f0 ∈ℜ is said to be a probably approximate near minimum of f (.) to
level α , also called Type II near minimum, provided that:
f0 ≥min
x∈X
f (x), PX{x ∈ X : f (x)< f0} ≤ α
Definition 4.3.2: (Probably Approximate Near Minimum to Accuracy ε and Level α
[43]) Let (X ,F ,PX) be a probability space, f : X → ℜ be a measurable function, and
ε,α > 0 be some given real numbers. Then f̂0 is said to be a probably approximate near
minimum of f (.) to accuracy ε and level α , also called Type III near minimum, if:
f̂0 ≥min
x∈X
f (x)− ε, PX{x ∈ X : f (x)< f̂0− ε} ≤ α (4.25)
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Next, we present a result that provides a probably approximate near minimum of Problem
4.1 to accuracy ε and level α . Appropriate lower bounds on control and disturbance sam-
ple sizes are provided which enable us to compute the aforementioned notion of probable
near minimum.
Theorem 4.3: Given ε,α,δ > 0, generate iid disturbance samples W 1, ...,W γ from W N
according to the probability measure PW and iid control samples y1, ...,yq from Y accord-
















Define Ĉ0 = mini=1,...,q




(y1, ...,yq) ∈ Y q,(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ : Ĉ0 ≥ miny∈Y
E{C(y,W )}− ε,




(y,W ) is the product probability measure on the space (Y
q×W γ). In other words
with confidence 1− δ , we can say that Ĉ0 is a probably approximate near minimum of
Problem 4.1 to accuracy ε and level α .
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 11.1, Algorithm 11.5, and Section 11.3.5
in [43]. We also provide the full proof for the sake of completeness.






C̃ = mini=1,...,q E{C(M̄i,V i,W )}. We will prove that C̃ is a probably approximate near
minimum of Problem 4.1 to level α . Let us define C∗ to be the optimal minimum to
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Problem 4.1. Clearly we observe that C̃ ≥C∗. We need to show that:
PqY
{
(y1, ...,yq) : PY
{






Let g(y) = −E{C(y,W )},y ∈ Y . Then g(y) is a random variable if y is generated ran-
domly from Y . Let the distribution function of this random variable be given by:
F(b) = PY{y ∈ Y : g(y)≤ b}






By definition a distribution function is right continuous. We define bα = inf{b : F(b) ≥
1−α}. By right continuity we get that F(bα)≥ 1−α . From the definition of bα we have
that if b < bα then F(b)< 1−α . Suppose that −C̃ ≥ bα . This implies that:
PY{y ∈ Y : g(y)>−C̃} = 1−F(−C̃) ≤ α
Taking the contrapositive of the above statement we get that:
PY{y ∈ Y : g(y)>−C̃}> α ⇒ −C̃ < bα
Now −C̃ < bα if and only if −E{C(yi,W )}< bα , i = 1, ...,q. Now these are independent
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events each with probability no larger than 1−α .
⇒ PqY
{





(y1, ...,yq) ∈ Y q : PY{y ∈ Y : E{C(y,W )}< C̃}> α
}
≤ (1−α)q












From this we conclude that C̃ is a probably approximate (Type II) near minimum of Prob-






From the Chernoff bound combined with Hoeffding’s inequality we get that:
PγW
{
(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ :
∣∣∣∣1γ γ∑j=1C(y,W j)−E{C(y,W )}
∣∣∣∣> ε}≤ 2e−2γε2
Consider C(yi,W ) and define S(γ,ε), Si(γ,ε), i = 1, ...,q as follows:
Si(γ,ε) =
{
(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ :




(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ :




(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ : max
i=1,...,q






(Si(γ,ε))c ⇒ S(γ,ε) =
q⋃
i=1










(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ : max
i=1,...,q
∣∣∣∣1γ γ∑j=1C(yi,W j)−E{C(yi,W )}
∣∣∣∣≤ ε}≥ 1− δ2
So we have with confidence 1− δ2 that:
∣∣∣∣1γ γ∑j=1C(yi,W j)−E{C(yi,W )}
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, i = 1, ...,q (4.26)
Using (4.26) we will show that:
∣∣∣∣ mini=1,...,q 1γ γ∑j=1C(yi,W j)− mini=1,...,q E{C(yi,W )}
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε
or in other words using the aforementioned notation we will show with confidence 1− δ2
that | Ĉ0−C̃ | ≤ ε . Let i∗ = argmini=1,...,q 1γ ∑
γ
j=1C(y
i,W j). Using (4.26) we get that:
∣∣∣∣E{C(yi∗,W )}− 1γ γ∑j=1C(yi∗ ,W j)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε ⇒ ∣∣E{C(yi∗,W )}−Ĉ0∣∣≤ ε
So we have −ε +E{C(yi∗,W )} ≤ Ĉ0. Since C̃ ≤ E{C(yi
∗
,W )} this implies that:
−ε ≤ Ĉ0−C̃
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Let i∗∗ = arg min
i=1,...,q











,W j) ≤ C̃+ ε ⇒ Ĉ0−C̃ ≤ ε
Combining these two results we get that with confidence 1− δ2 we have that:
∣∣∣∣ mini=1,...,q 1γ γ∑j=1C(yi,W j)− mini=1,...,q E{C(yi,W )}
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε
So far we have proved two statements:
PqY
{
(y1, ...,yq) ∈ Y q : P
{








(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ :
∣∣Ĉ0−C̃∣∣ ≤ ε}≥ 1− δ2
Now we combine both these statements to prove the claim of the Theorem. Since the
samples (y1, ...,yq) and (W 1, ...,W γ) are independent of one another:
P(q,γ)y,W
{






∣∣C̃−Ĉ0∣∣ ≤ ε implies that C̃ ≥ Ĉ0− ε and Ĉ ≥ C∗− ε . Also we have that:
PY
(










(W 1, ...,W γ) ∈W γ ,(y1, ...,yq) ∈ Y q : PY
(






which proves that Ĉ0 is a Type III near minimum of Problem 4.1 to accuracy ε and level
α .
Theorem 4.3 provides an appropriate criterion for sample size selection thereby
enabling us to compute, with a certain confidence level, a probable near minimum of
Problem 4.1. In contrast to the aforementioned results in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2,
computation of a probable near minimum does not require us to solve a convex program.
Therefore, if random samples could be rapidly generated, from the disturbance and ad-
missible control spaces, then we can practically implement these results to solve SRHC
problems on many small devices.
It is also possible to prove a result analogous to Theorem 4.3 by utilizing Pollard
dimension theory instead of the Chernoff bound. However, this leads to very large sample
sizes for the disturbances which makes this methodology impractical (see section 11.3.5
in [43] for more details and examples).
4.4 Incorporating Model Uncertainty
In this section, we incorporate model uncertainty into the problem formulation and
extend the results presented in Section 4.3. Consider the following linear time-invariant
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system in discrete time:
xi+1 = A∆xi +B∆ui +D∆wi, i ∈ Z+ (4.27)
where ∆ ∈ O which is assumed to be a compact and a convex set. The resulting matrices
A∆, B∆, and D∆ are assumed to have finite components for every ∆ in O . Due to the
presence of model uncertainty in the system dynamics, we cannot use equation (4.8) to
backtrack the disturbances from the states. Therefore, we will utilize the sub-optimal state
feedback scheme specified in equation (4.9). Using a compact notation we obtain:
X = Ā∆x0 + B̄∆U + D̄∆W (4.28)
where Ā∆, B̄∆, D̄∆ are the same as in Section 4.1 except for the presence of model uncer-
tainty in the system dynamics. Plugging the feedback scheme:
U = K̄X +Ṽ (4.29)
into equation (4.28) we get:
X = (I(Nn+n)×(Nn+n)− B̄∆K̄)−1
(
Ā∆x0 + B̄∆Ṽ + D̄∆W
)
(4.30)
Note that B̄∆K̄ is a strictly lower triangular matrix, therefore (I(Nn+n)×(Nn+n)− B̄∆K̄) is
non-singular. Let L = (I(Nn+n)×(Nn+n)− B̄∆K̄)−1. Using this notation the cost function
93
can be written as follows:















L Ā∆x0 +2W ′D̄′∆L
′
(



















′Q̄L B̄∆ +2R̄K̄L B̄∆ + R̄
)
Ṽ (4.31)
Let Cmmax be an upper bound to the cost C(K̄,Ṽ ,W,∆). Define the normalized cost








subject to the constraint:
‖K̄L (Ā∆x0 + B̄∆Ṽ + D̄∆W )+Ṽ‖∞ ≤Umax, W ∈W N ,∆ ∈ O
where the expectation is with respect to W and ∆.





{|(K̄L Ā∆x0 + K̄L B̄∆Ṽ +Ṽ )i|+‖(K̄L D̄∆)i‖1Wmax} ≤Umax, ∆ ∈ O
It should be noted that Problem 4.4.1 is in general a non-convex optimization prob-
lem. We employ the randomized algorithm techniques outlined in Section 4.3, to avoid
the computational complexity resulting from this non-convexity. Generate iid samples
((W 1,∆1), ...,(W γ ,∆γ)) of the noise, according to the product measure PW×∆, from the
space W N×O . First, we define the empirical mean of the cost function as follows:






C(K̄,Ṽ ,W i,∆i) (4.32)
We randomly generate the control parameters (K̄,Ṽ ) from the space Z , which is
specified below, and compute a probable near minimum to Problem 4.4.1.
Let z = (K̄,Ṽ ) and the admissible space Z be given by:
Z =
{
z ∈ℜNm×(Nn+n)×ℜNm : max
i=1,...,Nm
{ |(K̄L Ā∆x0 + K̄L B̄∆Ṽ +Ṽ )i|
+ ‖(K̄L D̄∆)i‖1Wmax } ≤Umax, ∆ ∈ O
}
Next, we state a result which is a generalization of Theorem 4.3 to the model uncertainty
case.
Theorem 4.4.1: Given iid noise samples (W 1,∆1), ....,(W γ ,∆γ) generated from W N ×
O according to the measure PW×∆ and iid control samples z1, ...,zr generated from Z
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Define Ĉm0 = mini=1,...,r
C(zi,(W 1,∆1), ...,(W γ ,∆γ)). Then with confidence 1−δ we can say
that Ĉm0 is a probably approximate near minimum of Problem 4.4.1 to accuracy ε and
level α .
Proof. The proof follows along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 4.3.
It should be noted that the techniques outlined in this theorem do not specifically
require us to solve a non-convex optimization problem. Therefore, this result can be ap-
plied to efficiently compute a probable near minimum to Problem 4.4.1. Ultrafast random
sample generation can be done on many small devices, utilizing analog circuits, making
such results practically applicable.
Next, we present an alternative problem formulation addressing the model uncer-
tainty case. We consider a problem formulation where the cost is maximized with respect
to both the additive disturbance as well as the model uncertainty and minimized with re-
spect to the control parameters. Such a formulation provides the control system designer
more flexibility and allows us to introduce alternative randomization based techniques.








‖K̄L (Ā∆x0 + B̄∆Ṽ + D̄∆W )+Ṽ‖∞ ≤Umax, ∀W ∈W N ,∀∆ ∈ O
We now present a notion of a probable near minimax value which was first devel-
oped in [47] (which also provides a detailed interpretation) and which will be used to state
a result.
Definition 4.4: (Probable Near Minimax Value to Minimum level α and Maximum
level β ) Let (X ,F ,PX) and (Y,G ,PY ) be given probability spaces, and α,β > 0 be given




f (x,y) be the
exact minimax value. A number f0 ∈ ℜ is said to be a probable near minimax value
of f (.) to minimum level α and maximum level β if there exists a measurable function
fL : Y →ℜ and a number fU ∈ℜ such that:
inf
y∈Y
fL(y)≤ f0 ≤ fU , inf
y∈Y
fL(y)≤ f ∗ ≤ fU
PX{x ∈ X : f (x,y)> fL(y)} ≤ β ,∀y ∈ Y
PY{y ∈ Y : sup
x∈X
f (x,y)< fU} ≤ α
Next, we randomly generate the controller parameters z = (K̄,Ṽ ), the disturbance
samples, and provide required bounds on respective sample sizes in order to compute a
probable near minimax value of Problem 4.4.2, with minimum level α and maximum
level β .
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Theorem 4.4.2: Generate iid model uncertainty samples (W 1,∆1), ...,(W ρ ,∆ρ) from the
sample space W ×O according to the probability measure PW×∆ and iid control samples




















Then we can say with confidence 1− (δα + δβ ) that Chyb is a probable near minimax
value of Problem 4.4.2 to minimum level α and maximum level β .
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 1 in [47] which relies on Lemma 11.1
in [43].
Theorem 4.4.2 provides a criterion for constructing a probable near minimax value
of Problem 4.4.2. A different version of Theorem 4.4.2 can also be provided for the case
when the exact minimax value forms a saddle point.
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4.5 Simulations











 , D = I3×3 (4.33)
We take Umax = 6, Wmax = 2, and horizon size N = 10. The symmetric positive
definite matrices Qi,Ri in the cost are selected as Qi = 5I3×3 and Ri = 3I2×2.Therefore,






 , i ∈ Z
+
We assume that the components wi,1,wi,2,wi,3 of the additive disturbance wi, are indepen-













We consider the formulation of Problem 4.1. The resulting optimization problem is
convex and we use the optimization software cvx [15] to compute the optimal solution.
The accuracy, confidence, and level parameters are taken as ε = 0.1,δ = 0.01,α = 0.05.
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RA Scheme State Norm
Figure 4.1: Randomized Algorithm Generated State vs Optimal State of Problem 2.1
using initial state [8,12,10]′
Using the sample size bounds specified by Theorem 4.3, greater than 530 iid control
samples and 614 iid disturbance samples are respectively generated to compute a probable
near minimum of Problem 4.1. We generate the control parameters by restricting the
components of the gain matrix M̄ to be less than |0.17| and the components of the vector
V to be less than |3.82|, while satisfying the control constraints. This assumption enables
us to generate high quality iid control samples rapidly from the admissible control space.
The initial state is assumed to be [8,12,10]′ and [9,−18,25]′ for the results pre-
sented in Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2, respectively. Only the first element of the control sample
which provides the probable near minimum value is selected and applied to the actual
dynamical system, as is typically done in RHC. Using this randomized scheme, the actual
state of the system is generated and compared to the actual state generated by the optimal
solution to Problem 4.1.
In Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2, the Euclidean norm of the state is used to compare the
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RA Scheme State Norm
Figure 4.2: Randomized Algorithm Generated State vs Optimal State of Problem 2.1
using initial state [9,−18,25]′
performance of the optimal and probable near minimum solutions of Problem 4.1, the
later of which is computed by the randomized scheme specified in Theorem 4.3. Simula-
tion results show that the randomized scheme performs pretty well though at the expense
of incurring some extra cost, which is as expected. From the simulations, we conclude
that such relaxed reformulations of the SRHC problem utilizing randomized algorithms
are computationally efficient, provide good performance, and can have important impli-
cations for any device which is unable to perform complex on-line optimization.
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Chapter 5: Optimal Sensor Placement for Intruder Detection
The fields of detection, resource allocation, and security have seen a lot of research
activity in the past few decades. Different frameworks have been designed to tackle vari-
ous problems using a host of techniques from statistics, engineering, and economics. The
fields of centralized and decentralized detection, see [48] for a review, have been a major
research focus in the communications, controls, and statistics communities and are now
considered mature. Our main focus in this chapter is to develop and pursue research ideas
in the intersection of these fields. In this chapter, we operate within the centralized detec-
tion framework under which complete observations are available to the decision makers.
This preference for a relatively simple and more developed framework enables us to fully
extract the benefits offered by the multi-disciplinary nature of these research ideas. In
contrast to the work in Chapter 2, where we designed control policies which revealed
partial state information to an adversary which was trying to estimate the terminal state
of the system, in this chapter we consider the problem of detecting an intruder present in
the environment of a system using a team of sensors.
Centralized detection of an intruder is considered, whose location is modeled as
uniform across a specified set of points. A team of sensors is tasked to make observations
which are then completely reported to a centralized decision making authority. The chal-
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lenge is to optimally place the sensors, before measurements are made, and to compute
an optimal decision rule for detecting the location of the intruder. Simplifying assump-
tions like a uniform prior distribution and conditional independence of observations are
assumed. It should be noted that sensor observations are noisy as a result of their inability
to make perfect observations. This limited capability of the sensors makes the conditional
independence assumption practically reasonable [49].
We exploit majorization theory, see [50] and [51] for a review, within the framework
of this chapter to establish general laws governing the jointly optimal detection and place-
ment policies. Majorization is an important mathematical technique for partial ordering
of vectors of real numbers. It is widely used in mathematical statistics and has recently
been applied to solve challenging problems in controls [52] and communications [53].
The following notation is adopted:
• Capital letters N and M are used to denote the number of sensors and the number
of placement points respectively.
• Vectors are represented as x̄ = (x1, ...,xk), where the vector length would be obvious
from the context.
• The observation vector received by the fusion center is denoted by ȳ = (y1, ...,yN ),
the position vector of the sensors is denoted by ū = (u1, ...,uN ), and the placement
vector for the sensors is denoted by v̄ = (v1, ...,vM).
• Random variables are represented by bold face capital letters, such as X is used
to represent the position of the intruder. Realizations are represented using small
letters.
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• The probability of error is denoted by Pe, the prior distribution by π , the probability
density of a random variable A if it exists by p(a), the joint probability density of
A and B by p(a,b), and the conditional probability density of A given B by p(a|b).
Here a and b are the realizations of the random variables A and B.
• The observation space is denoted by Ω.
This chapter is organized in four main sections. In Section 5.1 we provide the
problem formulation. The main results of this chapter are presented in Section 5.2 and
Section 5.3, respectively. In Section 5.2, we use mathematical induction to establish
general principles under which uniform placement of sensors is never strictly optimal.
In Section 5.3, majorization theory is exploited to formalize important properties of the
optimal placement. Simulation based results are discussed in Section 5.4.
5.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we present a precise statement and a mathematical formulation for
this problem. We first present a main assumption that will be utilized throughout this
chapter.
Assumption 5.1: We assume that the observations of the sensors are conditionally in-
dependent given the actual location of the intruder. In other words if ȳ = (y1, ...,yN)
are the observations reported by the sensors and if the actual location of the intruder is
j, j = 1, ...,M, then:




p(yi |X = j)
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5.1.1 Sensor Placement, Data Collection, and Performance Criterion
Consider a team of N identical sensors tasked with detecting the location of an
intruder X which can occur on a specified set of points {1, ....,M}, with a uniform distri-
bution. It is assumed that N ≤M. The sensors are placed using a specific sensor position
vector (or sensor placement vector), sensors make observations, and report them directly
to a fusion center. The observations made by the sensors are assumed to be conditionally
independent, given the true position of the intruder. The fusion center collects these ob-
servations and computes an estimate of the position of the intruder. It should be noted that
the sensors report complete observations to the fusion center. The performance criterion
minimized at the fusion center is the probability of error in detecting the actual location of
the intruder. The main problem is to design jointly optimal location detection and sensor
placement policies.
5.1.2 Observation Model
The sensor position vector ū, of length N, indicates the points at which each sensor
is placed whereas the sensor placement vector v̄, of length M, indicates how many sensors
are placed at each point. It should be noted that:
1≤ u j ≤M, j = 1, ...,N
0≤ vk ≤ N, k = 1, ...,M
Let Yk be the measurement obtained by sensor k, k = 1, ...,N. The random variable
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Yk either takes the value 1 (Intruder present at the position of sensor k) or the value 0
(Intruder not present at the position of sensor k). The observation model is presented
below:
Pr(Yk = 1|X = uk) = PD
Pr(Yk = 1|X 6= uk) = PF
where PD and PF are the local probability of detection and the local probability of
false alarm of the sensors respectively. We assume that these values are well known to us
and have been provided by the manufacturer of these sensors. It should be noted that the
sensors can only make measurements at the points on which they are placed and cannot
infer any information regarding the presence of the intruder at other points.
5.1.3 M-ary Hypothesis Testing
The problem is modeled as an M-ary hypothesis testing problem [7, pp. 46-52] un-
der the Bayesian formulation. Under a uniform prior distribution, πi = 1M , the probability
of error at the fusion center for a specific sensor position vector (u1, ...,uN ) is given by [8,
pp. 7-9]:












pū(ȳ |X = j)




and Γi = {ȳ ∈ Ω | δ (ȳ) = Hi}. Here pū(ȳ |X = j) is the conditional joint probability
mass function (pmf) for the random variables (Y1,...,YN) given that X= j and when the
sensor position vector, ū, is utilized for sensor placement. It should be noted that the
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joint pmf depends on the sensor position vector (or sensor placement vector). Since we
consider identical sensors using the same observation model it is sufficient to consider
the number of sensors which are placed at each point. In the calculation of the joint pmf,
the sensor placement vector is more convenient to use than the sensor position vector.
In the sequel, we will utilize the sensor placement vector v̄ = (v1, ...,vM) instead of the
sensor position vector ū = (u1, ...,uN ) to calculate the probabilities of error. It should be
noted that we use the notation pv̄(ȳ |X = j) for the conditional joint pmf for the random
variables (Y1,...,YN), given that X= j, and when v̄ is utilized as the sensor placement
vector.
5.1.4 Calculation of Conditional Probabilities
Since the observations are conditionally independent:




pv̄(yi |X = j), j = 1, ...,M
It should be noted that the probability of error is invariant to permutations of the
sensor placement vector, hence without loss of generality, we will only consider place-
ments of the form v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ....≥ vM . For notational convenience we assume that during
deployment the sensors are placed in an ascending order, i-e first v1 sensors are deployed
on point 1 followed by v2 sensors on point 2 and, so on. We hasten to add that this deploy-
ment policy is really not restrictive; it merely amounts to a relabeling of the observation
areas or locations: location 1 is the one with the most number of sensors, and so on. Thus
location j need not be ‘adjacent’ to location j− 1 or j+ 1. This deployment policy en-
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sures that observations (y1, ...,yv1 ) are made by sensors operating at point 1 and similarly
we can interpret the observations (yv1+1, ...,yN ). With N ≤M and the aforementioned as-
sumptions in place, it is clear that (vN+1, ...,vM) = (0, ...,0). Note that depending on the
values of the vi’s it is possible that vk = 0, for k = k0, ...,N where 2 ≤ k0 ≤ N, as well.












v j−a j (PF )
z(1,N)−a j ×
(1−PF )
N−z(1,N)−(v j−a j )χ(v j 6=0)
}
(5.1)
where a j is the number of accurate ‘alarmed’ sensors at location j and is given by:
a j = y1 + ...+ yv j , j = 1
a j = y(v1+...+v j−1 )+1
+ ...+ y
(v1+...+v j−1 )+v j
, j = 2, ...,M
and z(1,N) for any integer N is given by:
z(1,N) = y1 + ...+ yN
5.1.5 Problem Statement
Given N sensors and M placement points we want to solve the following optimiza-
tion problem:












pv̄(ȳ |X = j)
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subject to the constraints:
(v1, ...,vN ) ∈ Λ
N
where the set ΛN is given by the integer partition of N. For example Λ4 = {(4,0,0,0),
(3,1,0,0), (2,2,0,0), (2,1,1,0), (1,1,1,1)}
Definition 5.1: (Partition Function) The partition function f (N) of a positive integer N
is defined as the number of ways in which N can be written as a sum of positive integers.
For example, the integer 4 can be written as 4, 3+1, 2+2, 2+1+1, and 1+1+1+1
giving the partition function value, f (4) = 5.
Using this definition, the size of the constraint set ΛN is given by:
|ΛN |= f (N)








3 as N→ ∞
This expression was first proved by S. Ramanujan and G. Hardy in 1918. The form of
the cost function and the exponential complexity of the constraint set make this problem
difficult to solve for a general (N,M). We prove important solution properties for this
problem in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3.
For any placement v̄ the probability of error is given by:












pv̄(ȳ |X = j)
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pv̄(ȳ |X = j), i 6= k
}






∣∣∣∣ pv̄(ȳ |X = i) = maxk=1,...,M pv̄(ȳ |X = k)
}
(5.2)






∣∣∣∣ π(Hi|ȳ) = maxk=1,..,M π(Hk|ȳ)
}
, ȳ ∈Ω (5.3)
where π(H|ȳ) is the posterior distribution given the observation vector ȳ. Note that the
optimal decision rule in (5.3) is the Maximum A Posteriori Probability (MAP) rule. It
should be noted that the δ ∗ presented above is optimal for any arbitrary placement v̄ and
therefore the optimization problem can be rewritten as follows:











pv̄(ȳ |X = j) (5.4)
subject to the constraint:
(v1, ...,vN ) ∈ Λ
N
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pv̄(ȳ |X = j) (5.5)
where {0,1}N is used to denote the observation space Ω and Pe(v̄,PF ,PD) is a function of
(v̄,PF ,PD).
5.2 Characterization of the Optimal Solution
We first provide a definition of the strict optimality of a sensor placement and then
present the main results of this section.
Definition 5.2: (Strict Optimality of Placement) We call a placement v̄′ strictly optimal






















for any placement v̄ 6= v̄′ where (v1, ...,vN ) ∈ ΛN , (vN+1 , ...,vM) = (0, ...,0).
It should be noted that an optimal placement for (5.4) gives an optimal solution to
the aforementioned problem. Utilizing Definition 5.2, the main result of this section is
presented as follows:
Theorem 5.2: For the case (M = N), the uniform sensor placement (v1, ...,vN ) = (1, ...,1)
is not strictly optimal.
Proof. We will prove this result by utilizing mathematical induction. For notational con-
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pv̄(ȳ |X = j)} (5.6)
For M sensors we have 2M observations so {0,1}M is used to denote the observation space
Ω.


















(i, j) |X = 2
)}]
(5.7)
Using equation (5.1) the conditional probabilities for the (v1 ,v2) = (1,1) and (v1,v2) =
(2,0) placements are given as follows:
p(1,1)
(



























































First consider the case PD > PF:






























)− (PD−PF )< 0⇒ Pe(2,0)< Pe(1,1)












































)< (PF −PD)⇒ Pe(2,0)< Pe(1,1)












For the purposes of this proof it is sufficient to only consider the case PD ≥ PF . Further
details regarding this sufficiency are provided at the end of the proof. This proves that
uniform placement is not strictly optimal for M=N=2.
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Assume that the result holds for M=N=k:
Pe
(















Using equations (5.1) and (5.6) we get the following expression:
Pe
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1−y j (PF )










Using equations (5.1) and (5.6) we get the following expression:
Pe
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1−y j+1 (PF )













1−y j+1 (PF )

















1−y j+1 (PF )

























In order to prove the Theorem we need to show that:
Pe
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where c(ȳ),c∗(ȳ),d(ȳ),d∗(ȳ) are provided below:






















Using equations (5.1), (5.6) and (5.12) we get the following expression:
Pe
(
























If PD = 1 or PF = 0 then c
∗(ȳ) ≥ c(ȳ). If PD < 1 and PF > 0 then c∗(ȳ) can be expressed







First consider the case where we have good sensors i-e sensors for which PD ≥ PF . From
equation (5.17) we have that c∗(ȳ)≥ c(ȳ). Therefore, we can eliminate the terms involv-
ing c∗(ȳ) from equations (5.14) and (5.16). We will first consider the situations where we
can eliminate the terms involving d∗(ȳ) from equation (5.14) and then proceed by doing a
similar analysis for equation (5.16). If yk = 1, then d
∗(ȳ) = d(ȳ). Using equations (5.11),












k−1−(y1+...+yk−2)(PF −PD)≤ 0 (5.18)
From equations (5.11), (5.15), and (yk−1 ,yk) = (1,0) we obtain:
(PF )Ak(ȳ)+d
∗(ȳ) = (PF )Ak−1(ȳ)+d(ȳ) (5.19)
Similarly it can be shown for (y j−1,yk) = (1,0):
(PF )Ak(ȳ)+d
∗(ȳ) = (PF )A j−1(ȳ)+d(ȳ), j = 2, ...,k (5.20)
So for ȳ ∈ {0,1}k/(0, ...,0) we can eliminate the term (PF )Ak(ȳ) + d∗(ȳ) from equa-
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tion (5.14).
For the observation ȳ = (0, ...,0):
min
{















{PF Ai(y1, ...,yk)+d(y1, ...,yk)}, u = dec(y1 ...yk)+1
Here dec(y1...yk) is the decimal value of the binary number y1 ...yk . Equations (5.18),
(5.19), and (5.20) imply that:
∑
ȳ∈{0,1}k
















k−1 +PF (1−PD)(1−PF )
k−1










Using equation (5.13) for ȳ = (0, ...,0) we get that:
Bk(ȳ) ≤ Bi(ȳ) ≤ B1(ȳ), i = 2, ..,k−1




= PF Bk−1(0, ...,0)+d













−b1) =−(PF )(PD−PF )(1−PF )
k−1 (5.22)
We have two cases here PD ≥ PF ,PD(1−PD) ≥ PF (1−PF ) and PD ≥ PF ,PD(1−PD) <
PF (1−PF ). First we consider the case:
Case A: PD ≥ PF ,PD(1−PD)< PF(1−PF)
Using equation (5.13) and PD(1−PD)< PF (1−PF ) we get:
Bk(ȳ) < B1(ȳ) ≤ Bi(ȳ), ȳ = (1,0, ...,0)
⇒ b
2k−1+1




= PF Bk−1(1,0, ...,0)+d











= PF (PD−PF )(1−PF )
k−1 (5.23)
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PF B1(ȳ)+d(ȳ), ...,PF Bk−1(ȳ)+d(ȳ),PF Bk−1(ȳ)+d
∗(ȳ),PF Bk(ȳ)+d(ȳ)
}







































Pe(1, ...,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
































This proves the result for Case A. Next, we prove the result for Case B.
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Case B: PD ≥ PF ,PD(1−PD)≥ PF(1−PF)
For this case we will modify the induction steps slightly and use the above results and
discussions to complete the proof. We will show that:
(k+1)
[
Pe(1, ...,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1




≥ (PD−PF )(1−PD−PF )(1−PF )
k−1





= (PD−PF )(1−PD−PF )
Assume that it holds for M=N=k:
(k)
[
Pe(1, ...,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k




≥ (PD−PF )(1−PD−PF )(1−PF )
k−2 (5.24)
Using equation (5.13) and PD(1−PD)≥ PF (1−PF ):
B1(ȳ)≤ Bk(ȳ)≤ Bi(ȳ), ȳ = (1,0, ...,0)
⇒ b
2k−1+1




= PF Bk−1(1,0, ...,0)+ d


























) = PF (PD−PF )(PD +PF −1)(1−PF )
k−2
(5.25)
Consider the observation (y1, ...,yk) = (0,1,0, ..,0):
B1(ȳ)≤ Bk(ȳ)≤ Bi(ȳ), ȳ = (0,1,0, ...,0)
⇒ b
2k−2+1




= PF Bk−1(0,1,0, ...,0)+d
∗(0,1,0, ...,0).


















PF (PD−PF )(PD +PF −1)(1−PF )





Pe(1, ...,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1


























+ PDPF (PD−PF )(1−PF )
k−2
− PF (PD−PF )(1−PD−PF )(1−PF )
k−2 (5.27)
Using (5.24), (5.27), and the fact that PDPF (PD −PF )(1−PF )





Pe(1, ...,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1




≥ (PD−PF )(1−PD−PF )(1−PF )
k−1 ≥ 0
This proves the claim for the case PD ≥ PF .
A proof for the aforementioned case is sufficient to conclude that the result holds
for all values of PD,PF . This is due to the fact that for the case PD < PF the detector will
simply flip the observation bits and the same optimal strategy, which was employed for
the case PD > PF , will be employed by the fusion center.
Theorem 5.2 is somewhat counterintuitive and holds regardless of the values of PD
and PF . It is quite natural to assume that uniform placement of sensors should be strictly
optimal for sensors that possess a high detection probability and a low probability of
false alarm. This results proves that this natural assumption fails for the case when the
number of sensors equal the number of placement points. A system employing a sensor
placement policy utilizing the the results of this theorem can significantly outperform any
policy which does not take these results into consideration. These observations help in
preserving computational resources for systems which have limited computational and
optimization capabilities.
Next we present some important properties of the optimal placement, on the (PF ,PD)
plane, by varying the number of placement points. We prove that the optimal placement
structure on the (PF ,PD) plane, for the specific case of N < M, is invariant to an increase
in the value of M.
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Proposition 5.2: The sensor-placement point pairs (N,M1) and (N,M2), where N <M1 <
M2, have the same optimal placement structure on the (PF ,PD) plane.







tween these two cases. It should be noted that the length of the placement vector v̄ =
(v1, ...,vMi ) is indicated by Mi, i = 1,2.
First consider the case (N,M1) where we have N agents and M1 placement points.
For a specific placement vector v̄ the probability of error, Pe(v̄,PF ,PD)
∣∣
M1















pv̄(ȳ |X = j)} (5.28)
where pv̄(ȳ |X = j) is given by equation (5.1). Now v j = 0 for j = (N + 1), ...,M1.
Therefore, we can take pv̄(ȳ |X = j) = p(ȳ |X = N + 1) for j = (N + 1), ...,M1. Note
that p(ȳ |X = N + 1) does not depend on the placement vector v̄. This is due to the fact















pv̄(ȳ |X = j)+(M1−N)p(ȳ |X = N +1)
×χ(i 6=N+1)+ (M1−N−1)p(ȳ |X = N +1)χ(i=N+1)
]
(5.29)














p ˆ̄v(ȳ |X = j)+(M1−N)p(ȳ |X = N +1)
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×χ(i 6=N+1)+ (M1−N−1)p(ȳ |X = N +1)χ(i=N+1)
]
(5.30)





















pv̄(ȳ |X = j)+(M1−N)p(ȳ |X = N +1)
×χ(i 6=N+1)+(M1−N−1)p(ȳ |X=N+1)χ(i=N+1)+(M2−M1)p(ȳ |X=N+1)χ(i6=N+1)+
















p ˆ̄v(ȳ |X = j)+(M1−N)p(ȳ |X = N +1)
×χ(i 6=N+1)+(M1−N−1)p(ȳ |X=N+1)χ(i=N+1)+(M2−M1)p(ȳ |X=N+1)χ(i6=N+1)+
(M2−M1)p(ȳ |X = N +1)χ(i=N+1)
]
(5.32)















Since v̄ and ˆ̄v are two arbitrarily chosen placements whose first N elements belong to the
set ΛN , (5.33) implies that as we transition from (N,M1) to (N,M2) the comparison equa-
tions determining the optimal placements remain unchanged. Therefore, we conclude that
the sensor-placement point pairs (N,M1) and (N,M2) have the same optimal placement
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structure on the (PF ,PD) plane. This completes the proof.
Proposition 5.2 has important practical implications. It implies that if we are given
a sensor-placement pair (N,M), where N < M, we only need to analyze the sensor-
placement pair (N,N+1) and the optimal placement structure will be hold for all M > N.
This results in a significant reduction in computational complexity. Theorem 5.2 and
Proposition 5.2 can be utilized in the design of efficient algorithms for systems that have
limited computational capabilities for performing numerical optimization.
Corollary 5.2: Let V (N,M1) be the set of strictly optimal placements for the sensor-
placement pair (N,M1),M1 = N. Then V (N,M2) = V (N,M1)∪
{
(v1, ...,vN ) = (1, ...,1)
,(vN+1, ...,vM2 )= (0, ...,0)
}
is the set of strictly optimal placements for the sensor-placement
pair (N,M2), M2 > N.
Corollary 5.2 follows directly from Theorem 5.2, Proposition 5.2, and some basic
facts regarding the uniform placement of sensors. One can easily recognize the fact that
uniform placement of sensors will always belong to the set of strictly optimal placements
V (N,M), for a sensor-placement pair (N,M), N < M. This fact can be established by
considering extremely high values of PD along with extremely low values of PF .
5.3 A Majorization Approach
In this section, we will utilize some concepts from Majorization Theory to charac-
terize several important properties regarding the optimal placement of sensors. First, we
define some terms that will be used throughout the sequel.
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Definition 5.3.1: (Majorization [51], pp. 6-7) For x̄, ȳ ∈ℜn, x̄ is said to be majorized by





















where k = 1, ...,n−1 and x
[ j] represents the elements of x̄ in non-increasing order,
x
[1] ≥ ....≥ x[n] .
Definition 5.3.2: (Majorization-Based Partial Order) Sensor placements ᾱ, β̄ , and γ̄
can be placed on a majorization-based partial order (ᾱ, β̄ , γ̄) if the following ordering
exists: ᾱ  β̄  γ̄ . The placement ᾱ is said to be at the highest level on this partial order
followed by β̄ and then γ̄ .
Using the aforementioned definitions the main result of this section can be stated as fol-
lows:
Proposition 5.3: For N ≤ 6 and for fixed PD (or fixed PF ), increasing PF (or increasing PD)
leads to optimal placements that are higher in the majorization-based partial order.
Proof. We will only consider the sensor-placement pair (N,M) = (4,4). Other cases
where N ≤ 6 can be proved similarly.
The admissible placement set is given by ΛN = {(1,1,1,1),(2,1,1,0),(2,2,0,0),(3,1,0,0),
(4,0,0,0)}. Since N = M we do not need to consider the placement (1,1,1,1). Using
majorization theory the following majorization-based partial order can be defined:
(4,0,0,0) (3,1,0,0) (2,2,0,0) (2,1,1,0) (5.34)
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Using (5.6) we obtain the following optimality regions on the (PF ,PD) plane on which
these placements are respectively optimal. Detailed derivations which provide these re-
gions can be found in [56]. It should be noted that at points on which more than one
placement is optimal we choose the placement which preserves this result. For PD > PF ,
these regions are given as follows:




∣∣∣∣ (PD−PF )[−(PD +PF )(P2D +P2F )+(P2D +PDPF +P2F )+(1−P3F )]< 0}
(5.35)
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(2,2,0,0) is the optimal placement if (PF ,PD) belongs to the set:
{
(PF ,PD) ∈ [0,1]
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(2,1,1,0) is the optimal placement if (PF ,PD) belongs to the set:
{
(PF ,PD) ∈ [0,1]
2
∣∣∣∣ 2(1−PF )≥ PD} (5.38)
For PD = PF , all the placements have the same probability of error and therefore
we choose either the highest placement in the majorization-based partial order to be the
optimal placement or select other higher placements which preserve the statement of this
proposition.
Using (5.35), (5.36), (5.37), and (5.38), for PD > PF , and the aforementioned place-
ment policy at the boundary, PD = PF , we observe that by fixing PD in the interval [0,
2
3 ]
and by increasing PF , from 0 to PD , the optimal placement will be (2,1,1,0). For PD fixed
in the interval (23 ,
373
539 ] and by increasing PF from 0 to PD , the optimal placement will start
as the (2,1,1,0) placement and will then switch over to the (2,2,0,0) placement. For PD
fixed in the interval (373539 ,
947
1093 ] and by increasing PF from 0 to PD , the optimal placement
will start as the (2,1,1,0) placement, switch over to the (2,2,0,0) placement, and will
end up as the (3,1,0,0) placement. Finally for PD fixed in the interval (
947
1093 ,1] and for
PF increased from 0 to PD , the optimal placement will start as the (2,1,1,0) placement,
then switch over to the (2,2,0,0) placement first and then to the (3,1,0,0) placement,
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and finally end up as the (4,0,0,0) placement. This implies that for the sensor-placement
point pair (N,M) = (4,4) for fixed PD , increasing PF leads to optimal placements that are
higher in the majorization-based partial order.
Similarly, from equations (5.35), (5.36), (5.37), and (5.38) it can be shown that
for fixed PF , increasing PD leads to placements that are higher in the majorization-based
partial order.
We present a plot of (5.35), (5.36), (5.37), and (5.38) on the (PF ,PD) plane in Section
5.4 which further validates the statement of this proposition for the case M =N = 4. Other
cases where N ≤ 6 can be proved similarly by using equation (5.6).
For N > 6 the aforementioned result does not necessarily hold. Consider the case
where (N,M) = (7,8). Clearly (3,2,1,1,0,0,0)  (2,2,2,1,0,0,0), so (3,2,1,1,0,0,0)
is at a higher level than (2,2,2,1,0,0,0) on the majorization-based partial order for this
problem. Using equation (5.6) we get (3,2,1,1,0,0,0) as the optimal placement for
(PF ,PD) = (0.46,0.6) whereas (2,2,2,1,0,0,0) is the optimal placement for (PF ,PD) =
(0.48,0.6). Therefore for fixed PD and N > 6, increasing PF does not necessarily result
in the optimal placement being higher on the majorization-based partial order. Also for
(PF ,PD)= (0.48,0.5) the placement (3,2,1,1,0,0,0) is strictly optimal whereas (2,2,2,1,0,0,0)
is the strictly optimal placement for (PF ,PD) = (0.48,0.6). Therefore, we can conclude
that for fixed PF and N > 6, increasing PD does not necessarily result in the optimal place-
ment being higher on the majorization-based partial order and vice versa for fixed PD and
increasing PF . This counterexample clearly shows that this result does not necessarily
hold for N > 6.
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It should be noted that we are considering a partial ordering and therefore not all
elements of ΛN can be placed on a majorization-based partial order. There can be many
sets of optimal placements dependent on what we choose as the optimal placement at
points where no placement is strictly optimal. For a given (N,M), an important question
is the existence of a set of optimal placements which can be placed on a majorization-
based partial order. The following conjecture addresses this question:
Conjecture 5.3: For any (N,M) there exists a set of optimal placements,
ON = {(v1, ....,vM)|(v1, ....,vN ) ⊆ Λ
N ,(vN+1, ...,vM) = (0, ...,0)}, on the (PF ,PD) plane
which can be placed on a majorization-based partial order.
We explain the intuition behind this conjecture by considering the sensor-placement
pair, (N,M) = (6,6), which has ΛN of size |ΛN |= 11. Note that the placements (4,1,1)
and (3,3) are not comparable with respect to a majorization ordering. Similarly (3,1,1,1)
and (2,2,2) are not comparable. The conjecture would be false if every set of optimal
placements contained both (4,1,1) and (3,3) or contained both (3,1,1,1) and (2,2,2).
{(6,0),(5,1),(4,2),(3,2,1),(2,2,1,1),(2,1,1,1,1)} is a set of optimal placements for
this case. It should be noted that for high values of PF , PD ≥ PF , the optimal placements
tend to have a large number of sensors placed at a small number of points (concentrated
placement) and for low values of PF the optimal placements tend to have a small num-
ber of sensors placed at a large number of points (spread out placement). In this case
the placements (4,2),(3,2,1), and (2,2,1,1) are optimal in the regions where one would
have naturally expected the placements (3,1,1,1),(2,2,2),(4,1,1), and (3,3) to be op-
timal. The aforementioned example indicates existence of the following properties of
non-comparable placements which form the basis of this conjecture:
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• Placements containing sensors concentrated at few points but not enough to outper-
form other placements, for higher values of PF , which are highly concentrated and
can be placed on a majorization-based partial order.
• Placements containing sensors that are relatively spread out but not enough to out-
perform other placements, for lower values of PF , which have a higher spread of
sensors and can be placed on a majorization-based partial order.
• Placements not possessing a fine balance between concentration and spread of sen-
sors to be optimal for values of PF that are neither high nor low.
5.4 Simulations
We present two examples in this section that further illustrate the statements of the
theorems and propositions of Section 5.2 and Section 5.3.
Example 5.4.1: N = 4
Let (N,M) = (4,4), PD > PF . A (PF ,PD) plane using a set of optimal placements is
given in Fig. 5.1. The arrows are used to represent the regions, on the (PF ,PD) plane, in
which a particular placement is optimal. In Fig. 5.1 we observe that uniform placement
is not strictly optimal. Fig. 5.1 clearly shows that for fixed PD , increasing PF leads to
optimal placements that are higher on the majorization-based partial order which is given
by (5.34). Similarly for fixed PF , increasing PD leads to optimal placements that are higher
on the majorization-based partial order given by (5.34).
Now consider (N,M) = (4,5), PD > PF . A (PF ,PD) plane using a set of optimal
placements is given in Fig. 5.2. In Fig. 5.2, we observe that uniform placement is strictly
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Figure 5.1: Optimal Placement Structure over (PF ,PD) for (N,M) = (4,4)




















Figure 5.2: Optimal Placement Structure over (PF ,PD) for (N,M) = (4,5)
optimal along with the set of optimal placements for the case (N,M) = (4,4). This was
previously prescribed by Corollary 5.2 and this example provide a practical validation.
Example 5.4.2: N = 5
Consider the case (N,M) = (5,6), PD > PF . A (PF ,PD) plane using a set of optimal
placements for this case is given in Fig. 5.3. It is observed that by fixing either PD or PF , in-
creasing the other parameter leads to optimal placements that are higher on the majoriza-
tion based partial order: (5,0) (4,1) (3,2) (2,2,1) (2,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1,1). It
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Figure 5.3: Optimal Placement Structure over (PF ,PD) for (N,M) = (5,6)
should also be noted that uniform placement is strictly optimal in this case. These simula-
tions verify the statements of the results and signify their practical importance as outlined
in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Research Directions
6.1 Conclusions
In Chapter 2, several security constraints have been incorporated in the control syn-
thesis of a linear quadratic optimal control problem. The resulting optimization problems
have been shown to be convex. Lagrangian duality techniques have been used to compute
and characterize the optimal solutions and their properties. The optimal solution is shown
to be affine for the case when the terminal state has a continuous distribution. Utilizing
the standard optimization software cvx, we have computed the optimal control sequences
and have also validated the results via numerical simulations.
In Chapter 3, several team decision problems under security constraints have been
considered. We have analyzed the case where the respective terminal states of both sys-
tems are assumed to be identical. This problem is solved by utilizing the generalized
Kuhn Tucker theorem along with some regularity conditions. The structure of this prob-
lem is similar to the security problems considered in Chapter 2 and the similar techniques
are utilized to compute the optimal solutions. We have also considered the general case
where the terminal states of the decision makers are correlated. A generalized security
metric is utilized to introduce the security constraints. The resulting infinite dimensional
optimization problems have been shown to be convex. Utilizing the Kuhn Tucker Theo-
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rem in conjunction with some standard assumptions and regularity conditions the unique
optimal solution is shown to be affine in the information available to the respective deci-
sion makers.
In Chapter 4, We have introduced techniques from classical statistical learning the-
ory to develop several formulations of the SRHC problem. Pollard dimension for the
quadratic cost functions affiliated with the SRHC problem has been computed. Sample
size bounds are provided which enable us to compute several notions of near minimum
to the optimal solution. The problem framework has also been extended to incorporate
model uncertainity and related notions of near minimax values and affiliated performance
bounds have also been provided. These results have important applications due to their
efficiency and ease of implementation. Given mechanisms for random generation of con-
trol and noise samples, the randomized algorithm based solution methodology presented
in this chapter efficiently handles both convex and non-convex problems.
In Chapter 5, the problem has been formulated using a Bayesian M-ary hypothe-
sis testing framework. We have characterized several placement principles for sensors
tasked with detecting the location of a randomly placed intruder. In particular, notions
from Majorization Theory, such as majorization-based partial orders, have been used to
formalize important sensor placement properties. The uniform placement of sensors has
been thoroughly analyzed, resulting in conditions under which uniform placement is not
strictly optimal. In addition, changes in the optimal placement structure due to a variation
in the number of placement points and local sensor parameters have been analyzed and
related design principles have been presented.
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6.2 Future Research Directions
6.2.1 Linear Quadratic Control Under Security Constraints
For optimal control problems, subjected to security constraints, one future research
direction is to incorporate additive disturbances in the problem framework. This results
in a more general formulation of these problems and is considerably harder to tackle.
It shouled be noted that when the dynamical system is subjected to additive disturbances
then convergence of the state trajectories to a particular point cannot be guaranteed. How-
ever, the problem can be reformulated by requiring convergence to a norm ball around a
particular terminal state value. The cost function can also be reformulated by penalizing
the difference between the actual terminal state that the system attains as compared to the
required terminal state. It should be noted that with the incorporation of additive distur-
bance the optimization needs to be performed over a space of control policies rather then
control sequences. If control sequences are to be used instead of control policies then the
effects of disturbances would be unaccounted for and would lead to stability issues and
poor performance. New security metrics can also be designed and a performance analysis
can be done for different metrics within this framework. Computing the optimal solutions
for this extended framework are interesting future research problems. Dynamic program-
ming, the Maximum Principle, and other optimization techniques could be utilized to
compute a solution for these problems.
Another future research direction is to consider different measurement frameworks
for the adversary. One suggestion is to consider the case when the adversary gets a fixed
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number of random measurements of the state trajectory rather than the first k measure-
ments. If the adversary is allowed to incorporate different measurement frameworks then
the problem can also be formulated by utilizing techniques from non cooperative game
theory.
6.2.2 Team Decision Theory Under Security Constraints
For team problems one interesting extension is to consider the case when both de-
cision makers only have access to their own terminal states but do not have knowledge of
the terminal state of the other decision maker. The terminal states can be assumed to be
correlated in the sense that they have the same mean but different variances. A similar
security metric to the one utilized in Chapter 3 can also be used to enforce the security
constraints in this case. However, this is a challenging problem and requires a different
problem formulation. It would be interesting to compare the solution of this problem to
the team problems solved in Chapter 3. Techniques like the generalized Kuhn Tucker
Theorem and results from team decision theory like Radner’s theorem could be utilized
to compute a solution to this problem.
6.2.3 Optimal Sensor Placement for Intruder Detection
One research direction to pursue in problems of optimal sensor placement is to
consider the dynamic version of the problem stated in Chapter 5. Instead of just placing
the sensors once we can consider the case of redeploying the sensors at each time step
and using their reported measurements to track the intruder. The sensor placements and
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reported measurements in the previous time steps can be utilized to update the optimal
sensor placements. The intruder can be assumed to be either static, as was done in Chap-
ter 5, or dynamic in the sense that it changes its position at each step. Techniques from
dynamic programming can be utilized to obtain a solution to these problems. We also
assumed a uniform prior distribution for the problem framework in Chapter 5. An inter-
esting extension is to consider other prior distributions for the location of the intruder. It
would be interesting to pursue these extensions and to develop some generalized sensor
placement and detection principles for these problems.
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